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A joint venture is established when two or more firms pool their resources to achieve 
some objective under the combined management of the parent companies. Joint ventures 
are an increasingly common and important type of cooperative strategy in today’s 
dynamic markets. The synergy hypothesis states that joint ventures are formed to create 
synergies resulting from sharing complementary skills and resources and stock markets 
should react positively to joint venture announcements. Joint ventures are also established 
to share risk to overcome uncertainty in demand and technology. Previous literature on 
joint ventures is drawn from the welfare effects of joint ventures. However, there has 
been a little amount of study on both risk and welfare effects of joint venture 
announcements on shareholder’s wealth. For that reason, this dissertation is entirely 
dedicated to fill this existing gap in joint venture literature. 
 
In chapter 1, the "standard event study" technique based upon the market model is used to 
examine the risk, diversification and return effects of domestic joint venture 
announcements. Total risk is partitioned into systematic risk and unsystematic risk. The 
overall sample analysis indicates that the systematic risk decreases while unsystematic 
risk and total risk increase. The same applies to the sub-sample where two parent 
companies from different industries announce a joint venture in an entirely different 
industry. There is no significant change in all three risk measures when both parents 
choose not to diversify. The results for the sub-sample where both parents within the 
same industry engage in a joint venture in a different industry indicate that the systematic 
risk decreases while unsystematic and total risks remain the same. Similarly, when a sub-
sample is created where one parent is in the same industry as the joint venture, the results 
for the non-diversifying parent provide evidence that the systematic risk decreases and 
while there is no change in systematic and unsystematic risks. Finally, the findings for the 
diversifying parents evidence that unsystematic risk and total risk increase and the 
systematic risk falls. For all the samples, the estimation results suggest that there is strong 
evidence that the shareholders of the companies engaged in joint ventures, on average, 
experience highly significant positive abnormal returns – approximately between 16 
percent and 44 percent - at the time of such announcements. These results show returns 
that are relatively much higher than those found in previous studies.  
 
Chapter 2 aims at finding empirical evidence for the relative size hypothesis in joint 
venture announcements involving only two firms that differ in their sizes for the period of 
1981 to 2002. Market capitalization and abnormal returns based on the market model 
methodologies are utilized. Each firm in the sample is categorized as “small”, “medium” 
or “large” firm based upon its market capitalization. The findings support the relative size 
hypothesis predicts that market reaction to a joint venture announcement is inversely 
related to firm’s size relative to its partner.  
  
The risk analysis of joint ventures between small and large size partners shows that 
systematic risk for both parents, regardless of their relative size, decreases while 
unsystematic and total risk levels do not change. Secondly, when the joint venture is 
between small and medium size parents, the medium size parents benefit from lower 
level of systematic risk through joint ventures whereas small parents experience no 
change in systematic risk. Both small and medium size parents do not observe any 
change in both total and unsystematic risks. Finally, when a sub-sample is formed where 
medium size firms partner with large firms, medium size firms do not experience any 
change in all three risk measures while large size firms experience increase in all three 
measures of the risk.  
  
Chapter 3 studies the impact of industry concentration on the choice of expansion mode 
between joint ventures and IPOs. The literature related to this study can be partitioned 
into two groups. The first group focuses on the ownership choice between JV and 
wholly-owned subsidiary modes of entry. On the other hand, the second group studies the 
effects of IPO announcements on rival firms within the same industry. However, there 
has not been any study on the choice of expansion mode between joint ventures and IPOs 
under different degrees of industry concentration. For this, two different hypotheses are 
developed and tested: The first hypothesis states that when target industry is highly 
concentrated, the preferred mode of expansion should be join venture. The second 
hypothesis states that when negative competitive effects are stronger than positive 
information effects, IPO firms will choose highly concentrated industry. This study finds 
empirical support for the second hypothesis but not for the first one. The empirical 
findings show that both IPO and joint venture companies tend to choose highly 
concentrated industries. The welfare effect of both IPO and joint venture announcements 
on shareholders’ wealth is also examined. The findings document that in the longer time 
period (180 days), cumulative average excess return for IPO firms is significantly greater 
than cumulative average excess return for joint venture firms. 
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Chapter 1. First Essay: 
Re-examining the Risk and Return Effects of Joint Ventures:  




This study attempts to fill an existing gap in the literature on joint ventures by 
highlighting risk and return aspects of such cooperative strategies. The sample for this study is 
composed of companies engaged in domestic joint ventures over the period of 1981 - 2002. The 
study uses the "standard event study" technique based upon the “market model”. For the purpose 
of risk analysis, total risk is partitioned into systematic risk and unsystematic risk. In order to see 
if there is any difference in the risk and welfare effects of joint ventures under different joint 
venture structures, the initial sample is divided into different sub samples based on Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) codes of parent companies and the joint ventures. The overall 
sample analysis indicates that the systematic risk decreases while unsystematic risk and total risk 
increase. The same applies to the sub-sample where two parent companies from different 
industries announce a joint venture in an entirely different industry. The analysis for the sample 
where both parents choose not to diversify shows no significant change in all three risk measures. 
The results for the sub-sample where both parents within the same industry engage in a joint 
venture in a different industry exhibit weak evidence that the systematic risk decreases while, 
with strong evidence, unsystematic risk and total risk remain the same. Similarly, when a sub-
sample is created where one parent is in the same industry as the joint venture, the results for the 
non-diversifying parent provide weak evidence that the systematic risk decreases and strong 
evidence that there is no change in unsystematic risk and total risk. Finally, the findings for the 
diversifying parents show strong evidence that unsystematic risk and total risk increase and weak 
evidence that the systematic risk falls. For all the samples, the estimation results suggest that 
there is strong evidence that the shareholders of the companies engaged in joint ventures, on 
average, experience highly significant positive abnormal returns – approximately between 16 
percent and 44 percent - at the time of such announcements. These results show returns that are 
relatively much higher than those found in previous studies. However, average abnormal returns 











Chapter 1: Re-examining the Risk and Return Effects of Joint 
Ventures: New Empirical Evidence 
1. Introduction 
A joint venture is a way of combining resources to achieve some objective. Two or more 
parent companies pool their resources to accomplish that objective (described henceforth) 
under the combined management of the parent companies. It is a new legal entity owned 
by two or more parent firms. In this regard, joint ventures are different from corporate 
mergers. Management under the joint venture differs from that of the parent firms - the 
original management of the parent firms remains intact under the joint venture.  While 
mergers join two firms together, joint ventures create entirely new entities (McConnel 
and Nantell, 1985).          
 Joint ventures are an increasingly common and important type of cooperative 
strategy in the domestic and international business arena. Brodley (1982) lists some of the 
reasons for forming joint venture agreements: to achieve cost savings, to alter industry 
conduct, and to restructure production in ways profitable to the parent firms. McConnell 
and Nantell (1985) emphasize different motives for establishing joint ventures and group 
them under “synergistic” gains resulting from sharing complementary skills and 
resources. They are as following: 1) Risk sharing to overcome uncertainty in demand and 
technology 2) Achieve economies of scale in production 3) augmented market power 4) 
enhanced marketing and product distribution techniques 5) Reallocation of assets to more 
profitable uses.        
 Hennart (1991) mentions further instances where joint ventures can be 
advantageous; the first is when a joint venture is a diversification strategy for the parent. 
 3 
This happens when a joint venture operates in a different market from that of the parent 
firm. In this case, the parent may find that intermediate inputs needed to venture into a 
new industry are held by another parent, are difficult to acquire by contract, are costly to 
replicate, and are therefore most efficiently obtained through a joint venture. Secondly, 
for the case of international joint ventures, a firm that enters a foreign market for the first 
time is also likely to opt for a joint venture. This is because such a firm will lack the 
knowledge of local conditions. Thirdly, firms may also engage in joint ventures to obtain 
access to resources that are controlled by other firms. This is likely to be the case in 
natural resource industries where government policies discourage or forbid full 
ownership by international companies. Finally, joint ventures are used to combine 
complementary inputs held by two separate firms, when the market for both of these 
inputs has high transaction costs. In another study, Hennart (1988) argues that joint 
ventures are efficient and should be the preferred mode of cooperative strategy when two 
conditions are met at the same time: (1) imperfect intermediate goods (know-how, raw 
materials, parts and machinery etc.) market where parent firms operate; (2) purchase or 
reproduction of the resources that used in the production of those goods is more costly 
than procurement of the right to use the same under the joint venture agreement. In case 
of market failure for intermediate goods, being co-owner in the new entity will help 
reduce or eliminate parent firms’ incentive to deviate from their objective set by joint 
venture agreement. The seller of the intermediate goods will have less incentive to take 
advantage of the buyer by increasing prices or lowering the quality of the goods. 
Therefore, joint venturing can lower the transaction cost of pooling intermediate inputs 
into the production process. Also, acquiring the resources is less efficient than having the 
 4 
right to use them through joint ventures when the required assets for use in the production 
process cannot be separated from non-required ones (Hennart, 1988).   
 When parent companies contract into a joint venture, the resultant structure can be 
classified as either horizontal or vertical. If both the parents and the joint venture are in 
the same industry, then the resulting entity is an example of a horizontal joint venture. 
This horizontal joint venture will then operate in the same product or service market as 
the parent companies, although management may be located elsewhere.  Vertical 
strategic alliances (also referred to as diversifying or cross-product strategies) arise when 
the parent firms and the joint venture are not in the same industry. The motivation for 
vertical joint ventures is usually the search for new skills, technology and resources 
(Gleason et al., 2003). Some evidence shows that horizontal strategic alliances generate 
higher abnormal returns than vertical strategic alliances1 (Chan et al.,1997). Previous 
studies on joint ventures have focused either upon the wealth or output effects of joint 
ventures in single industries such as steel (Scheuerman, 1990), chemicals (Backman, 
1965; Berg and Friedman, 1977), real estate (He et al., 1997), and financial services 
industries (Waheed and Mathur, 1995; Gleason et al., 2003) or upon antitrust treatments 
of joint ventures (Brodley, 1982; Grossman and Shapiro, 1986; Shapiro and Willig, 
1990).           
 Although motivations for joint ventures are strong, it is questionable whether in 
fact they have positive effects on shareholders’ wealth. Past studies have found mixed 
results. Gleason et al. (2003) study the effects of joint venture and strategic alliances 
announcements in a sample of companies in the banking, investment services, and 
                                                 
1 While joint ventures and strategic alliances are both forms of cooperative strategies, strategic alliances are 
less formal and represent less structured contractual agreements.  
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insurance industries. They find that these companies earn significant abnormal returns of 
0.66 percent on average. They also find significantly positive abnormal returns across the 
four different modes of expansion: domestic, international, horizontal and diversifying. 
Johnson and Houston (2000) find that horizontal domestic joint ventures create 
synergistic gains that are shared by the partners, whereas vertical ones generate gains 
only for suppliers. McConnell and Nantell (1985) investigate the common stock returns 
of U.S. companies that announce joint ventures with other U.S. companies and find that 
there are significant excess returns around the announcement date. They also find that 
smaller partners earn larger excess rate of return. Kwoka (1992) finds support for wealth 
creation effects of joint ventures when there is no alteration in the competitive behavior 
of parent firms after the joint venture. He et al (1997) study the wealth effects of 
domestic versus international joint ventures in the real estate industry.  Their results 
suggest that domestic real estate joint ventures lead to an increase in firms’ value while 
international joint ventures have non-significant or less significant value creation effects. 
 While there are studies that have shown positive wealth effects on the 
announcement date, the literature has also indicated that joint ventures can have negative 
effects on stock returns on the announcement date.  Waheed and Mathur (1995) study 
announcement effects of foreign expansions through formations of different expansion 
modes, such as joint ventures, subsidiaries, acquisitions, representative offices or 
branches, on the market value of U.S. banks. For the overall sample, they find that 
shareholders of banks earn significant abnormal returns of negative 0.17 percent on the 
announcement day. They also find that the two-day (-1,0) cumulative average abnormal 
returns for U.S. banks is negative 0.11. Mohanram and Nanda (1996) find that the US 
 6 
stock market reacts negatively to domestic joint ventures that are motivated by value 
reducing managerial concerns. Another study by Chang and Chen (2002) finds similar 
results. They study joint ventures by Taiwanese firms and find that domestic joint venture 
announcements are associated with negative abnormal returns. They also find that 
announcement effects are positively related to investment opportunities, the size of the 
investment and debt ratio, and are negatively related to the business-relatedness variable2. 
 Previous studies on joint ventures have not focused adequately on the risk-sharing 
and risk-reducing motivations for creating joint ventures. Contrary to usual expectations 
in business, it might be the case that companies do not reduce their financial risks when 
they get involved in establishing joint ventures. Kogut (1989) has attempted to analyze 
the stability of joint ventures. Factors that improve stability include, but are not limited 
to, other forms of binding agreements between the parent firms (Kogut refers to this 
factor as ties), and R&D intensity.  Factors that negatively impact stability include, but 
are not limited to, changes in concentration, and industry growth that leads to competitive 
rivalry. Competitive factors that motivate the creation of a joint venture have support in 
the expectation that rivalry between the partner firms would be lessened. However, these 
factors can also be the source of future instability. As indicated by Berg and Friedman 
(1981), larger firms seek joint ventures as a medium of technology transfer. Instability 
can then be triggered by technology imitation, price distortion and competition among the 
partners (Kogut, 1989).         
 Several gaps exist in the literature on joint ventures.  Most importantly, risk 
associated with contracting into joint venture agreements has not been adequately 
                                                 
2The business-related variable refers to parent firms announcing the joint venture that have the same two-
digit SIC code.  
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examined. This paper aims at testing the risk-reducing or risk-sharing motive for 
establishing joint ventures. In addition, this study also finds empirical evidence for the 
welfare effects of joint venturing on shareholders’ wealth in a larger sample. This paper 
aims at finding empirical evidence for the two most important motives for establishing 
joint ventures: i) synergy gains resulting from sharing complementary skills and 
resources and ii) risk-sharing through diversifying joint venture as a corporate strategy. 
Previous studies have not studied these two motives together. Therefore, it is expected 
that this study will shed some light on the return, risk and diversification aspects of joint 
ventures that have previously been inadequately studied. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows: section two presents the data and methodology; section three 
discusses empirical results and test statistics; section four concludes the paper. 
2. Data and Methodology 
 The sample for this study is composed of companies engaged in only two-parent 
joint ventures over the period of 1981 - 20023. The sample of joint venture announcing 
companies was taken from the Securities Corporation Platinum Database. Both parents 
are included in the joint venture analysis. The final sample is limited to those companies 
whose stock returns are available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
For the purpose of extracting stock returns from CRSP, CUSIP numbers in the data set 
are merged with PERMNOs (permanent numbers identifying the companies) that are 
available in CRSP. In order to test whether risk-sharing through diversification is a valid 
                                                 
3 The very large data set and the availability of the data posed certain difficulties in determining whether 
the joint ventures were domestic or international.  The scope of this study does not allow for the 
classification of joint ventures into domestic and international forms, but this issue will be addressed in a 
future study.  
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motive for creating a joint venture, five different sub-samples are constructed.  The first 
sub-sample consists of those firms with different SIC codes that engage in a joint venture 
also with a different SIC code. The second sub-sample is composed of those firms that 
have the same SIC codes and engage in a joint venture with the same SIC code as each 
firm. The third sub-sample consists of those firms with the same SIC codes that engage in 
a joint venture with a different SIC code.  The fourth sample is that where one parent is a 
diversifying parent, that is, only one firm has a different SIC code from the joint venture. 
The fifth sub-sample is then one where the other parent has the same SIC code as the 
joint venture, that is, one parent is non-diversifying parent. In this study, the last three 
sub-samples are referred to as partial-diversification strategies.  
 To satisfy the requirement of cross-sectional independence, which is a common 
requirement in event studies to conduct test statistics, multiple announcements, except for 
the very first announcement in the overall sample, by the same companies are removed 
from the other five sub-samples. This process also eliminates the apparent “over-
representation problem”, which occurs when joint ventures are announced more than 
once by the same companies. Finally, only companies with 501 days non-missing returns 
data around the announcement days (+250, 0, -250) are included in the study. After 
satisfying all the requirements, 2,188 companies are left for the overall sample analysis. 
This sample size is very large compared to previous studies conducted on the wealth 
effects of joint ventures. 
2.1. Market Model 
The "standard event study" technique based upon the market model is used to test 
the effect of announcements on stock returns (see Brown and Warner, 1985).  The event 
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study has many applications in the areas of economics, finance and accounting. Some 
examples of the economy wide events include mergers and acquisitions, earnings 
announcements, new issues of securities, and announcements related to macroeconomic 
variables such as trade deficits (MacKinlay, 1997). Economists frequently study the 
effects of such an economic event on the value of firms. They use financial data to 
measure the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm. The rationality behind the 
event study is that the effects of the event will be reflected immediately in security 
returns. Therefore, measuring the impacts of a specific event on security prices can be 
constructed in a relatively short time. In contrast, productivity related measures might 
take many periods of observation.  
The market model relates the return of any individual security to the return of 
market portfolio. The advantage of using the market model is that it allows the researcher 
to control for the effects of market-wide fluctuations to measure daily abnormal returns 
(the market model residuals). Commonly used market portfolios are the S&P 500 index, 
the CRSP Value Weighted Index, and the CSRP Equal Weighted Index. In this study 
CRSP Equal Weighted Index returns is used as market returns.  
For any security j the market model is:  
                     jtmtjjjt RR εβα ++= ˆˆ                                                           (1) 
Rjt = the return on security j for period t. 
αj = the intercept term assumed to be constant over the entire time period. 
βj = the systematic risk for security j. 
Rmt = the market return on the CRSP equal-weighted index in time period t. 
εjt = the error term on security j for period t. 
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The date of the joint venture announcement is taken as the event date and defined 
as day t = 0.  Additionally, the behavior of average abnormal returns is reported over the 
event window of days (-5, +5). Pre-event parameters are estimated from the market 
model over the period t = -250 to t = -30 days relative to the announcement date. Post-
event parameters are estimated over the period t = +30 to t = +250 days relative to the 
announcement day4. 
This study tests to see whether synergy gains and risk-sharing through 
diversification are valid motivations for the creation of joint ventures. For the purpose of 
risk analysis, total risk (variance of daily stock returns for security j) is partitioned into 
two components: systematic risk (security j’s beta) and unsystematic risk (variance of the 
error term εj in the market model). The systematic risk is a measure of how an individual 
asset co-varies with the economy, and the unsystematic risk is a firm specific risk and 
independent of the economy. To test if there is any significant change in all three risk 
measures after the announcement, changes in the systematic (∆SYS), unsystematic risk 
(∆UNSYS) and total risk (∆TOTAL) are computed as: 
                           ∆SYS = (βj, post) - (βj, pre) 
                     ∆UNSYS = Var(εj, post) - Var(εj, pre) 
          ∆TOTAL = Var (Rj, post) –Var(Rj, pre) 
 
 
                                                 
4 Waheed and Mathur (1995) use (-170 to –21) and (+21 to +170) as the “pre-event” and “post-event” 
periods respectively. However, in this study, the market model is run for different time periods, but 
changing the time periods did not affect the direction of the results derived from the market model. To 
check for robustness, daily average excess returns based upon equal-weighted market index and associated 




2.2. Standardized Abnormal Return 
By using the "standard event study" technique and following Waheed and Mathur 
(1995), the average standardized abnormal return (AAR) for security j for day t is 
estimated as:  














                                              (2) 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the market model 
parameters α and β over the estimation period t = -250 days to t = -30 days relative to the 
announcement day, and the maximum likelihood estimate of standard deviation ( jtS ) is 
computed as: 























VS                                               (3) 
where, 
Rmt = market return on the CRSP equal-weighted index in time period t. 
Rm = mean market return in the estimation period. 
Vj
2 = residual variance of security j.  
D = number of days in the estimation period.  
N = number of announcements in the sample. 
Rjt = return on security j for period t. 
The standardized t statistic is applied to test the hypothesis that standardized 
average abnormal returns equal zero. In order to make sure that there is no outlier effect, 
the binomial sign test (B-value) is also employed to test that the proportion of positive 
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(negative) abnormal returns expected under the null hypothesis is 0.50. The B-values are 
estimated as (S-PN)/√P(1-P)N ~ N(0,1) where N is number of announcements in the 
sample, P is the proportion of positive average abnormal returns under the null hypothesis 
(0.50) and S is the number of positive average residuals (Waheed and Mathur, 1995).   
3. Empirical Results 
Panel A in Tables 1 to 6 shows daily standardized average abnormal returns 
(AAR), the Z-values, number of companies with positive daily average abnormal returns 
(POSAVG), the proportion of daily average positive abnormal returns (%), sample size 
(N) and the binomial sign test statistic (B-value) for two-party joint ventures. The Z-value 
is the standardized t statistic to test the hypothesis that the daily average abnormal returns 
equal zero. The binomial sign test (B-value) is used to test if the proportion of positive 
abnormal returns in the test period is significantly different from the proportion of 
positive abnormal returns expected under the null hypothesis (0.50). The binomial sign 
test is employed to check if a few outliers affect the abnormal returns. 
In panel B of Tables 1 to 6, ∆SYS refers to change in systematic risk, ∆UNSYS 
refers change in unsystematic risk, ∆TOTAL refers to change in total risk, N+ refers to 
the number of companies for which there is an increase in the risk level after the joint 
venture announcement, N- refers the number of companies for which there is a decrease 
in the risk level after the joint venture announcement. Associated test statistics - the 
ranked sign test and paired t-test - for each risk measures are also provided in panel B. 
The paired t- test (one tail test) statistic tests whether the mean difference for 
unsystematic risk and systematic risk is different from zero. SIC1, SIC2 and JVSIC refer 
to SIC codes for the first parent, the second parent and the joint venture respectively. To 
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check if changes in the levels of the risk measures, ∆SYS, ∆UNSYS and ∆TOTAL, are 
due to outliers, the median signed rank (Wilcoxon) test statistics are also presented in 
panel B (see for example, Siegel & Castellan; Nonparametric Statistics, 2nd ed.; p.90).  
Panel A of Table 1 shows the standardized daily average abnormal return (AAR) 
estimations and the associated test statistics for the overall sample of 2188 firms. The 
AAR on the day of announcement is 30 percent, which is significant at the one percent 
level. This indicates that, for the overall sample, there is strong evidence that the 
shareholders of the companies engaged in joint ventures, on average, experience highly 
significant positive abnormal returns at the time of such announcements. 
 
Table 1: Daily average abnormal returns and test statistics for the overall sample. 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5  0.023 1.089 1007 46.02 2188 -3.720*** 
-4  0.055***  2.566 1033 47.21 2188 -2.608*** 
-3 -0.005 -0.240 985 45.01 2188 -4.661*** 
-2 -0.001 -0.034 1021 46.66 2188 -3.121*** 
-1  0.038*  1.756 1047 47.85 2188 -2.010** 
 0  0.300***  14.051 1174 53.65 2188  3.421*** 
 1  0.028  1.315 1026 46.89 2188 -2.907*** 
 2 -0.004 -0.206 1028 46.98 2188 -2.822*** 
 3 -0.044** -2.059 982 44.88 2188 -4.789*** 
 4 -0.060*** -2.791 964 44.05 2188 -5.558*** 
 5 -0.004 -0.202 995 45.47 2188 -4.233*** 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint ventures are risk-reducing strategies. 
Significance of the change in systematic, unsystematic and total risks is tested using 
the t-statistic for means and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z). 
 
Risk N+ N-          Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 1041 1147 -2.628 0.0086 -2.10 0.0181 
∆UNSYS 1179 1009  4.326 0.0000  3.30 0.0005 
∆TOTAL 1183 1005  4.685 0.0001  3.44 0.0003 
 ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Since 1174 (i.e., 54 %) of 2188 announcements have positive abnormal returns, and the 
binomial sign test shows that it is significant at 1% level, this finding is not due to an 
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outlier effect. The announcement day t = 0 is the only day on which more than 50 percent 
of the companies significantly observe positive returns. On the day t = 1, there is positive 
2.8 percent return but it is not significantly different from zero. The proportion of 
companies that observe positive abnormal returns before and after the announcement day 
(t = 0) is significantly less than 50 percent. The positive and significant announcement 
effect disappears the day after the announcement (t = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Panel B of Table 1 
reports the change in the levels of systematic, unsystematic and total risk measures. Both 
the t-statistics and the Wilcoxon ranked-sign test statistics significantly indicate that 
systematic risk has decreased and unsystematic and total risks have increased. If number 
of assets in a well-diversified portfolio is large enough, then the unsystematic risk tends 
towards zero. Therefore, if a single asset becomes part of well-diversified portfolio, the 
unsystematic risk can be diversified away and therefore it can be ignored. However all 
securities will have some level of systematic risk that cannot be eliminated through 
diversification. Because systematic risk is directly related to movements in overall market 
conditions such as inflation and interest rates. These movements occur regardless of what 
an individual investor follows as an investment strategy. The systematic risk is then the 
most crucial risk for all investors.  Since the findings for overall sample in Panel B of 
Table 1 show that the systematic risk has decreased, it can be concluded that firms share 
risk through joint ventures and that risk-sharing motive is a valid motive for joint 
ventures.  
Table 2 refers to the sub-sample where both parent firms and the joint venture 
have different SIC codes. In this study, since each parent company and the resulting joint 
venture have entirely different SIC codes, it is referred to as full-diversification strategy. 
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Panel A shows that the AAR at t = 0 is 0.36 which is significant at the one percent level 
and higher compare to AAR of 0.30 for overall sample in Table 1. Again 539 (i.e., 56 %) 
of 956 announcements have positive returns, this finding cannot be attributed to any 
outlier effect since the binomial sign test statistic (B-value of 3.95) shows that on the day 
of announcement (t = 0) proportion of announcements with positive abnormal return is 
significantly greater than 50 percent . 
 
Table 2: Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) where both parent firms and joint 
venture have different SIC codes (SIC1 ≠ SIC2 ≠ JVSIC).  
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.050 -1.539 434 45.39 956 -2.846*** 
-4  0.051  1.578 453 47.38 956 -1.617 
-3 -0.010 -0.310 413 43.20 956 -4.205*** 
-2  0.044  1.348 456 47.69 956 -1.423 
-1  0.020  0.606 460 48.11 956 -1.164 
 0  0.357***  11.028 539 56.38 956  3.946*** 
 1  0.008  0.232 454 47.48 956 -1.552 
 2  0.008  0.254 443 46.33 956 -2.264** 
 3 -0.065** -2.016 421 44.03 956 -3.687*** 
 4 -0.071** -2.188 412 43.09 956 -4.269*** 
 5 -0.048 -1.473 430 44.97 956 -3.105*** 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint ventures are risk-reducing strategies. 
Significance of the change in systematic, unsystematic and total risks is tested using 
the t-statistic for means and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z). 
 
Risk N+ N- Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 447 509 -2.36 0.0092 -2.34 0.0098 
∆UNSYS 532 424  4.39 0.0000  3.75 0.0001 
∆TOTAL 539 417  4.59 0.0000  3.88 0.0001 
 ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
In Panel B of Table 2, the t-statistic shows that companies have lower level of systematic 
risk and higher level of unsystematic and total risks after the joint venture announcement 
when both parents diversify. The Wilcoxon ranked sign test also supports the same result. 
Increase in total risk, however, is due to an increase in unsystematic risk which in turn 
can be diversified away. This indicates that parents following a full-diversification 
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strategy benefit from risk sharing through joint ventures as the stock markets view those 
joint venture announcements as indicative of diversifying cooperative strategy. Table 3 
refers to the sub-sample where the parent firms and the joint venture have the same SIC 
codes. That is, this sample includes firms that choose not to diversify through joint 
ventures. 
 
Table 3: Daily average abnormal returns where both parent firms and joint 
venture have the same SIC codes (SIC1 = SIC2 = JVSIC). 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 0.170***  2.886 150 52.08 288  0.707 
-4 0.048  0.813 136 47.22 288 -0.943 
-3 0.007  0.117 131 45.49 288 -1.532 
-2 0.037  0.633 133 46.18 288 -1.296 
-1 0.077  1.299 143 49.65 288 -0.118 
 0 0.160***  2.721 146 50.69 288  0.236 
 1 0.049  0.825 136 47.22 288 -0.943 
 2 -0.007 -0.121 135 46.88 288 -1.061 
 3 -0.091 -1.546 125 43.40 288 -2.239** 
 4 -0.089 -1.518 126 43.75 288 -2.121** 
 5 0.015  0.253 139 48.26 288 -0.589 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint ventures are risk-reducing strategies. 
Significance of the change in systematic, unsystematic and total risks is tested using 
the t-statistic for means and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z). 
 
Risk N+ N-          Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 136 152 -0.57 0.2856  0.21 0.4155 
∆UNSYS 145 143  0.73 0.2335 -0.39 0.3487 
∆TOTAL 142 146  0.64 0.2619 -0.34 0.3861 
 ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the AAR at t = 0 is 0.16 which is again significant at the 
one percent level. However in the case of non-diversifying joint venture announcements 
(Table 3), the AAR at t = 0 is lower (16%) than the AAR of 36% when the joint venture 
is a diversifying strategy (Table 2). This indicates that shareholders of diversifying firms 
gain more than the shareholders of non-diversifying firms. In Panel B, the t-test statistic 
and the nonparametric sign test statistic together show that there is no significant change 
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in systematic, unsystematic and total risks. These results show that there is no risk 
sharing benefit associated with joint venture announcements established between parent 
firms that have the same SIC code as joint venture industry. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the results where both parent companies have the same 
SIC code but the joint venture has a different SIC code. In this sample parent firms 
diversify by establishing a joint venture in an entirely different industry even though 
parent firms are from the same industry.  
 
Table 4: Daily average abnormal returns where parent companies have the same SIC 
codes but the joint venture has a different SIC code (SIC1 = SIC2 ≠ JVSIC).  
Panel A 
 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.002 -0.044 155 47.26 328 -0.994 
-4 -0.079 -1.434 150 45.73 328 -1.546 
-3 -0.036 -0.658 140 42.68 328 -2.650*** 
-2  0.014  0.246 155 47.26 328 -0.994 
-1  0.135**  2.439 159 48.48 328 -0.552 
0  0.164***  2.964 170 51.83 328  0.663 
1  0.094**  1.707 158 48.17 328 -0.663 
2  0.008  0.154 156 47.56 328 -0.883 
3 -0.078 -1.405 139 42.38 328 -2.761*** 
4  0.013  0.243 159 48.48 328 -0.552 
5 -0.096* -1.745 140 42.68 328 -2.650*** 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint ventures are risk-reducing strategies. 
Significance of the change in systematic, unsystematic and total risks is tested using 
the t-statistic for means and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z). 
 
Risk N+ N- Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 144 184 -1.55 0.0602 -0.54 0.2947 
∆UNSYS 174 154  0.62 0.2676 -0.18 0.4300 
∆TOTAL 174 154  0.73 0.2341 -0.12 0.4523 
 ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The AARs at days t = -1, 0 and 1 are 0.14, 0.16 and 0.09 respectively and they are all 
significant.  In panel B of Table 4, the t-test statistic shows that there is no change in both 
systematic and unsystematic risks after the joint venture announcement. However, the 
Wilcoxon ranked sign test statistic shows that at the 6 percent significance level 
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systematic risk decreases after the announcement. This finding suggests that the evidence 
for fall in systematic risk is more apparent when both parents from different industries 
establish joint venture in entirely different industry (full-diversification strategy) as 
shown in Table 2. The number of companies with a decrease in systematic risk (184) is 
greater than that of companies with an increase in systematic risk (144). This shows that 
parent firms within the same industry become less risky after establishing joint venture in 
a different industry.  
Another sub-sample is created where one parent is in the same industry as the 
joint venture industry. In this sample one of the parents that has different SIC code from 
joint venture is classified as diversifying parent and the other parent is classified as non-
diversifying parent. Table 5 shows results for the non-diversifying parents and Table 6 
shows results for the diversifying parents.  
Table 5: Daily average abnormal returns for non-diversifying parents (parent 2) that 
have same SIC code as the joint venture (SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC).  
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5  0.031  0.491 117 45.70 256 -1.375 
-4  0.048  0.771 118 46.09 256 -1.250 
-3 -0.004 -0.071 117 45.70 256 -1.375 
-2  0.051  0.810 122 47.66 256 -0.750 
-1  0.112*  1.795 130 50.78 256  0.250 
 0  0.388***  6.213 128 50.00 256  0.000 
 1  0.031  0.502 128 50.00 256  0.000 
 2 -0.082 -1.317 127 49.61 256 -0.125 
 3  0.025  0.395 126 49.22 256 -0.250 
 4  0.009  0.139 125 48.83 256 -0.375 
 5  0.014  0.231 118 46.09 256 -1.250 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint ventures are risk-reducing strategies. 
Significance of the change in systematic, unsystematic and total risks is tested using the 
t-statistic for means and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z). 
 
Risk N+ N- Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 107 149 -2.24 0.0126 -0.92 0.1788 
∆UNSYS 119 137 -0.51 0.3061 -0.38 0.3515 
∆TOTAL 118 138 -0.51 0.3061 -0.37 0.3559 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 5 shows that the AAR at t = 0 is 0.39 which is significant at the one 
percent level. The AAR on day t = -1 is 11.2 percent and it is significant at ten percent 
level. However, the AARs after the announcement day are not significantly different 
from zero. On day t = 0, the number of companies with a positive abnormal return (128) 
is the same as the number of companies with a negative abnormal return (128). 
Additionally, the binomial sign test shows that proportion of total announcements with 
positive abnormal returns is not significantly different from 50 percent for each day in the 
event window of [-5,5]. In panel B of Table 5, both the binomial sign test and the t-test 
statistics show that systematic and unsystematic risk for non-diversifying parents remain 
the same after joint venture announcement. However the sign test shows that the 
systematic risk has decreased after the announcement.   
Table 6: Daily average abnormal returns for diversifying parents (parent 1) that have 
different SIC code from the joint venture (SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC). 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5  0.050  0.995 198 50.38 393  0.151 
-4  0.167***  3.305 187 47.58 393 -0.958 
-3  0.029  0.574 189 48.09 393 -0.757 
-2 -0.046 -0.915 184 46.82 393 -1.261 
-1  0.079  1.575 184 46.82 393 -1.261 
 0  0.435***  8.626 197 50.13 393  0.050 
 1  0.104**  2.057 182 46.31 393 -1.463 
 2  0.070  1.382 192 48.86 393 -0.454 
 3  0.005  0.099 188 47.84 393 -0.858 
 4 -0.042 -0.839 180 45.80 393 -1.665* 
 5 -0.076 -1.502 175 44.53 393 -2.169** 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint ventures are risk-reducing strategies. 
Significance of the change in systematic, unsystematic and total risks is tested using 
the t-statistic for means and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z). 
 
Risk N+ N- Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 181 212 -1.17† 0.1210 0.02 0.4916 
∆UNSYS 224 169  3.18 0.0007 2.89 0.0020 
∆TOTAL 221 172  3.43 0.0003 3.05 0.0012 
            ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
            † significant with p-value of 12.10 percent. 
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Panel A of Table 6 shows that the AAR on the day of announcement is 43.5 
percent and significant at one percent level. Additionally, the AAR on day t = 1 is 10.4 
percent for diversifying parent and it is also significant at five percent level. The binomial 
sign test statistics in panel B of Table 6 indicate that the proportion of total 
announcements with positive abnormal returns is not significantly different from 50 
percent for each day in the event window except for days t = 4 and 5. In Panel B, the 
nonparametric sign test statistics show that systematic risk has decreased at 12 percent 
significance level. The number of companies with decrease in systematic risk (212) is 
greater than the number of companies with an increase in systematic risk (181). This 
provides some evidence that diversifying parent becomes less risky after announcing 
joint venture in different industry. On the other hand, the t test statistics show there is no 
significant change in systematic risk but there is a significant increase in unsystematic 
and total risks.  
In general the findings in Tables 5 and 6 together suggest that when only one 
parent diversifies through joint venture, shareholders of diversifying parents, on average, 
earn higher abnormal return on the announcement day. In addition, the findings also 
suggest that when only one parent diversifies, the binomial sign test shows that the 
systematic risk for diversifying parent decreases with twelve percent significance level. 
This finding is not supported by the t-test. However, both the sign test and t-test statistics 
show that the unsystematic and total risks for diversifying parent increase at one percent 
significance level. Similarly, the sign test also shows that the systematic risk for the non-
diversifying parent decreases whereas the t-test shows that there is no significant change 
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in the systematic risk. On the other hand, both the sign test and t-test statistics indicate 
that there is no significant change in unsystematic and total risk measures. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study tests to see whether diversification and risk-sharing are valid 
motivations for the creation of joint ventures. The "standard event study" technique based 
upon the market model is used to examine the risk and return effects of two-parent joint 
venture announcements.  
To investigate if synergy gains and risk-sharing through diversification are valid 
motives for joint ventures, five different sub-samples are constructed. The overall sample 
includes firms announcing joint venture for the very first time. Similarly, the five sub-
samples also include first joint venture announcements except when an announcement 
made by a firm exists in a sub-sample more than once, then that firm is excluded from the 
sub-sample. The test statistics for the overall sample evidence that the systematic risk 
decreases while unsystematic and total risk increase. The same results apply to the sub-
sample where two firms from different industries announce a joint venture in an entirely 
different industry (full-diversification strategy). When a security is hold in isolation, 
increase in total risk might indicate that the risk due to uncertainty in the new product 
market outweighs the diversification benefits gained from joint ventures. However, the 
firm-specific unsystematic risk should not be important for an individual investor holding 
a well-diversified portfolio of assets. Conversely, the analysis for the sample where both 
parent companies are in the same industry as the joint venture, non-diversifying strategy, 
shows that there is no change in all three risk measures after the joint venture is 
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announced. Thus, these findings show that a full-diversification strategy reduces 
systematic risk and validates the risk-sharing motive for a joint venture.  
The same analysis is applied to the remaining sub-samples in which either one 
parent firm is from the same industry as the joint venture or both parents are within the 
same industry but establish a joint venture in a different industry. These sub-samples 
could be referred to as partial-diversification strategies. 
The binomial sign test statistics for the parents where both are in the same 
industry but engage in a joint venture in a different industry evidence that the systematic 
risk decreases while unsystematic risk and total risk remain the same. However, the 
reduction in the systematic risk is not supported by the t-test. Finally, when a sub-sample 
is created where only one parent is in the same industry as the joint venture, the findings 
for non-diversifying parents show a reduction in systematic risk while unsystematic risk 
and total risk remain the same. However, in the case of diversifying parents, the binomial 
sign test shows that unsystematic risk and total risk increase while the systematic risk 
decreases. However, the reduction in systematic risk for diversifying parent is not 
supported by the t-test. In general, the findings for the last three sub-samples (partial-
diversification strategies) somewhat show weak evidence for reduction in systematic risk. 
On the other hand, the full-diversification strategies through joint ventures exhibit strong 
evidence that the systematic risk falls. And finally non-diversification strategies present 
no change in all three risk levels. 
For all the samples, the shareholders of the companies engaged in joint ventures, 
on average, experience highly significant positive abnormal returns based upon the 
market model– between approximately 16 percent and 44 percent - at the time of such 
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announcements. Average abnormal returns after the day of announcement are mostly 
negative or not significantly different from zero. Another important finding of this paper 
is that the full-diversification strategies yield higher abnormal returns on the 
announcement day than those of non-diversifying strategies (36% as opposed to 16% 
abnormal returns). This also true when only one parent diversifies and the second parent 
doesn’t, diversifying parent earns higher abnormal return on the announcement day (44 
percent as opposed to 39 percent).  These results contradict the findings of Gleason et al 
(2003), Weston and Copeland, 1988, Sicherman and Pettway, 1987, and Scanlon, Trifts, 
and Pettway, 1989 that suggest that corporate mergers/joint ventures in a related business 
line (horizontal or non-diversifying strategies) dominate mergers in different industries 


















A1. Daily Average Excess Returns for Three-day Event Window 
 
Table A1: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market index for three-day 
event window and associated t-test statistics. 
 
Type of joint venture N Day (t) AER σ t-value p-value 
 
Full-diversification strategy 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 956 -1 0.0010 0.052 0.58 0.5605 
Non-diversifying 
SIC1 = SIC2 = JVSIC 288 -1 0.0047 0.054 1.47 0.1426 
Partial diversification 
SIC1 = SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 328 -1 0.0069*** 0.045 2.75 0.0063 
Diversifying parent (parent 1) 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC 393 -1 0.0026 0.048 1.08 0.2800 
Non-diversifying parent (parent 2) 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC 256 -1 0.0072*** 0.043 2.72 0.0069 
Full-diversification strategy 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 956 0 0.0156*** 0.065 7.44 <.0001 
Non-diversifying 
SIC1 = SIC2 = JVSIC 288 0 0.0129*** 0.072 3.04 0.0026 
Partial diversification 
SIC1 = SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 328 0 0.0074*** 0.050 2.68 0.0076 
Diversifying parent (parent 1) 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC 393 0 0.0163** 0.144 2.25 0.0247 
Non-diversifying parent (parent 2) 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC 256 0 0.0161*** 0.088 2.91 0.0039 
Full-diversification strategy 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 956 
 
+1 0.0009 0.057 0.47 0.6397 
Non-diversifying 
SIC1 = SIC2 = JVSIC 288 +1 0.0066 0.076 1.48 0.1398 
Partial diversification 
SIC1 = SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 328 +1 0.0048 0.055 1.57 0.1164 
Diversifying parent (parent 1) 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC 393 +1 0.0035 0.047 1.48 0.1401 
Non-diversifying parent (parent 2) 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC 256 +1 0.0001 0.040 0.04 0.9654 
 
Table A1 in the Appendix 1 presents daily average excess returns based upon equal-
weighted marked index are obtained from CRSP. For all five sub-samples, the findings 
suggest that there is strong evidence that the shareholders of the companies engaged in 
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joint ventures, on average, experience positive and significant excess returns – 
approximately between 1.29 to 1.63 percent - at the time of such announcements. 
However, daily average excess returns one day before and one day after the day of 
announcement (days t = -1 and t = +1) are not significantly different from zero except for 
day t = -1. On this day, the non-diversifying parent in the sub-sample where SIC1 ≠ SIC2 
= JVSIC earns positive and significant excess return of 0.72 percent. On the same day,  
the diversifying parents in the partial diversification sample where  SIC1 = SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 
earn positive and significant excess return of 0.69 percent. 
 





Table A2: Summary of the Tables 1 through 6 presented in section 3 of Chapter 1. 
Samples 
AAR  
(t = 0)  
Type of Joint 






(n=2188) 30 % NA Decrease Increase 
 
Increase 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 
(n=956) 36 % Full-diversification Decrease Increase 
 
increase 
SIC1 = SIC2 = 
JVSIC (n=288) 16 % Non-diversifying No change No change 
 
No change 
SIC1 = SIC2 ≠ JVSIC 




(weak evidence) No change 
 
No change 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC 




(weak evidence) No change 
 
No change 
SIC1 ≠ SIC2 = JVSIC 
(n=393) 44 % Diversifying parent 
Decrease 
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Chapter 2. Second Essay: 
Risk and Return Effects of Joint Ventures: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Relative Size Hypothesis 
Abstract 
 
The second essay aims at finding empirical evidence for the relative size hypothesis in 
two-parent joint venture analysis over the period of 1981 – 2002. To test for the validity of the 
relative size hypothesis, two methodologies are utilized:  i) market capitalization ii) abnormal 
returns based upon the market model. Each firm in the sample is categorized as “small”, 
“medium” or “large” firm in the joint venture according to its market value of common equity. 
Then, three sub-samples are formed in such a way that relatively different size parents announce 
joint venture: i) small vs. large ii) small vs. medium and iii) medium vs. large. Empirical findings 
based on these two methodologies support the relative size hypothesis predicts that market 
reaction to a joint venture announcement is inversely related to firm’s size relative to its partner. 
The risk analysis of joint ventures between small and large size partners shows that systematic 
risk for both parents, regardless of their relative size, decreases while unsystematic and total risk 
levels do not change. Secondly, when the joint venture is between small and medium size parents, 
the medium size parents benefit from lower level of systematic risk through joint ventures 
whereas small parents experience no change in systematic risk. Both small and medium size 
parents do not observe any change in both total and unsystematic risks. Finally, when a sub-
sample is formed where medium size firms partner with large firms, medium size firms do not 
experience any change in all three risk measures while large size firms experience increase in all 









Chapter 2: Risk and Return Effects of Joint Ventures: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Relative Size Hypothesis 
1. Introduction         
 A joint venture is established when two or more firms pool their tangible and 
intangible assets to achieve some objective under the combined management of the 
parent companies. It is a new legal entity owned by two or more parent firms. One of the 
most important characteristics of joint ventures is that they are formed temporarily and 
that providers of intermediate goods claim on the residual resulting from the operations 
of the joint venture. In this regard, joint ventures are different from corporate mergers. 
Management under the joint venture differs from that of the parent firms - the original 
management of the parent firms remains intact under the joint venture.  While mergers 
join two firms together, joint ventures create entirely new entities (McConnel and 
Nantell, 1985).         
 McConnell and Nantell (1985) emphasize several motives for establishing joint 
ventures and group them under “synergistic” gains resulting from sharing complementary 
skills and resources. They are as following: 1) Risk sharing to overcome uncertainty in 
demand and technology 2) Achieve economies of scale in production 3) augmented 
market power 4) enhanced marketing and product distribution techniques 5) Reallocation 
of assets to more profitable uses.         
 Hennart (1991) mentions further instances where joint ventures can be 
advantageous; the first is when a joint venture operates in a different market from that of 
the parent firm. In this case, the parent may find that intermediate inputs needed to 
venture into a new industry are held by another parent, are difficult to acquire by 
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contract, are costly to replicate, and are therefore most efficiently obtained through a joint 
venture. Secondly, for the case of international joint ventures, a firm that enters a foreign 
market for the first time is also likely to opt for a joint venture. This is because such a 
firm will lack the knowledge of local conditions. Thirdly, firms may also engage in joint 
ventures to obtain access to resources that are controlled by other firms. This is likely to 
be the case in natural resource industries where government policies discourage or forbid 
full ownership by international companies. Finally, joint ventures are used to combine 
complementary inputs held by two separate firms, when the market for both of these 
inputs has high transaction costs.        
 In another study, Hennart (1988) adopts the transaction cost theory of join 
ventures and argues that joint ventures are efficient and should be the preferred mode of 
cooperative strategy when two conditions are met at the same time: i) imperfect 
intermediate goods market where parent firms operate (know-how, raw materials, parts 
and machinery etc.); ii) purchase or reproduction of the resources that used in the 
production of those goods is more costly than procurement of the right to use the same 
under the joint venture agreement. In case of market failure for intermediate goods, being 
co-owner in the new entity will help reduce or eliminate parent firms’ incentive to deviate 
from their objective set by joint venture agreement. The seller of the intermediate goods 
will have less incentive to take advantage of the buyer by increasing prices or lowering 
the quality of the goods. Therefore, joint venturing can lower the transaction cost of 
pooling intermediate inputs into the production process. Also, acquiring the resources is 
less efficient than having the right to use them through joint ventures when the required 
assets for use in the production process cannot be separated from non-required ones.  
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 Previous studies on joint ventures that are closely related to the objective of this 
paper can be categorized as: the “wealth effect” and the “size effect” studies. The size 
effect refers to the anomaly that small firms, on average, earn higher returns than large 
firms. The joint venture literature under these two categories provides mixed results. 
 Some studies on the wealth effects of joint ventures show that shareholders 
experience significantly positive abnormal returns at the announcements of joint ventures 
(Gleason et al.,2003; Johnson and Houston, 2000; Mohanram and Nanda, 1996; 
Kwoka,1992; He et al.,1997; McConnell and Nantell, 1985). Gleason et al. (2003) study 
the effects of joint venture and strategic alliances announcements in a sample of 
companies in the banking, investment services, and insurance industries. They find that 
these companies earn significant abnormal returns of 0.66 percent on average. They also 
find significantly positive abnormal returns across the four different modes of expansion: 
domestic, international, horizontal and diversifying. Johnson and Houston (2000) find 
that horizontal domestic joint ventures create synergistic gains that are shared by the 
partners, whereas vertical ones generate gains only for suppliers. McConnell and Nantell 
(1985) investigate the common stock returns of U.S. companies that announce joint 
ventures with other U.S. companies and find that there are significant excess returns 
around the announcement date. They also find that smaller partners earn larger excess 
rate of return. Kwoka (1992) finds support for wealth creation effects of joint ventures 
when there is no alteration in the competitive behavior of parent firms after the joint 
venture. He et al (1997) study the wealth effects of domestic versus international joint 
ventures in the real estate industry.  Their results suggest that domestic real estate joint 
ventures lead to an increase in firms’ value while international joint ventures have non-
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significant or less significant value creation effects.      
 However, some other studies show that market reaction to the announcements of 
joint ventures could be negative as shown by Waheed and Mathur,1995; Mohanram and 
Nanda,1996; Chang and Chen,2002. Waheed and Mathur (1995) study the effects of 
foreign expansion on the market value of U.S. banks. They find that shareholders of 
banks earn significant abnormal returns of negative 0.17 percent on the announcement 
day. Mohanram and Nanda (1996) find that the US stock market reacts negatively to 
domestic joint ventures that are motivated by value reducing managerial concerns. 
Another study by Chang and Chen (2002) finds similar results. They study wealth effects 
of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms and find that domestic joint venture 
announcements are associated with negative abnormal returns.    
 However, there has been little amount of research on firm size and joint ventures. 
Previous studies that address the size effect of joint ventures are by Chang and Chen 
(2002), Chen, Hu and Shieh (1991), Crutchley, Guo and Hansen (1991), Mohanram and 
Nanda (1996), McConnell and Nantell (1985). However, the empirical results on the size 
effect of joint ventures are also mixed. Joint ventures offer small firms access to 
resources from which they may otherwise be foreclosed. Hence, the strategic benefits 
associated with domestic joint ventures are likely to be higher for smaller firms. 
Furthermore, joint venture announcements by large firms may convey less unexpected 
information than those by small firms, as information production and spreading is related 
to firm size. Therefore, the stock market’s response to a joint venture announcement 
should be inversely related to firm size relative to its partner. Also, when a small firm is 
able to attract the attention of a much larger firm into a joint venture, this could lead to 
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positive adjustment in the small firm’s valuation (Mohanram and Nanda, 1996). Further, 
Dollinger (1990) and Dollinger and Golden (1992) show that cooperative strategies 
reduce uncertainties exist in market conditions for small firms and improve their sales 
performance.          
 Chang and Chen (2002) find that announcement effects are positively related to 
investment opportunities, the size of the investment and debt ratio, and are negatively 
related to the business-relatedness variable5. Finally they find that firm size has no 
explanatory power in explaining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures by 
Taiwanese firms. Therefore, their results do not support the relative size hypothesis. 
Mohanram and Nanda (1996) study US domestic joint ventures and find evidence for the 
absolute size hypothesis. They document that the smaller firms gain benefit when 
strategic motivation is the main driving source for the domestic joint venture. Chen, Hu 
and Shieh (1991) examine joint ventures in China announced by 73 US-based firms 
during the period of 1979-90 and find that the US partners earn significantly positive 
abnormal return. However, they find that abnormal returns are not related to firm size, or 
to the US partners’ prior presence in China. Crutchley, Guo and Hansen (1991) look at 
joint venture announcements between the US and Japanese firms and find that the market 
reacts positively to the US partners over the announcement period. They also find 
evidence for the size effect that smaller US partners experience higher abnormal returns 
relative to larger Japanese partners. Moreover, they show that the US partner’s 
percentage gain from the joint venture is inversely related to that partner’s size. In 
particular they report that relatively larger Japanese partners experience larger percentage 
                                                 
5The business-related variable refers to parent firms announcing the joint venture that have the same two-
digit SIC code.  
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gains than do relatively smaller Japanese partners. McConnell and Nantell (1985) find 
that the smaller partner in a domestic joint venture earns a larger abnormal return, but the 
smaller dollar value, than the larger partner.       
 These mixed findings suggest that further evidence on the size effect of joint 
ventures is definitely needed. Furthermore, while previous studies on the wealth and size 
effects of joint ventures provide insightful information, they have not investigated these 
issues together with risk effects associated with joint venture announcements, which is 
central to this study. Thus, the previous findings reflect only one side of the story without 
analyzing the risk associated with joint venture announcements.  Contrary to common 
expectations, it might be the case that companies do not reduce their financial risks when 
they get involved in establishing joint ventures. Kogut (1989) has attempted to analyze 
the stability of joint ventures. Factors that improve stability include, but are not limited 
to, other forms of binding agreements between the parent firms (Kogut refers to this 
factor as ties), and R&D intensity.  Factors that negatively impact stability include, but 
are not limited to, changes in concentration, and industry growth that leads to competitive 
rivalry. Competitive factors that motivate the creation of a joint venture have support in 
the expectation that rivalry between the partner firms would be lessened. However, these 
factors can also be the source of future instability. As indicated by Berg and Friedman 
(1981), larger firms seek joint ventures as a medium of technology transfer. Instability 
can then be triggered by technology imitation, price distortion and competition among the 
partners (Kogut, 1989).          
 Therefore, the direction of change in risk after the joint venture announcement 
remains to be an empirical question that has not been studied. Moreover, the previous 
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studies on joint ventures used smaller sample size relative to the sample size used in this 
study. Hence, this study aims at filling the gap in the literature by providing empirical 
evidence for both wealth and risk effects of joint ventures in the context of the relative 
size hypothesis. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section two presents the 
data and methodology; section three discusses empirical results and test statistics; section 
four concludes. 
2. Data and Methodology        
 This paper examines stock market reactions to the joint venture announcements 
involving only two firms that differ in their sizes for the period of 1981 to 2002. The 
sample of joint venture announcing companies was taken from the Securities Corporation 
Platinum Database. To test for the validity of relative size hypothesis, two methodologies 
are utilized:  i) market capitalization and ii) abnormal returns. Different criteria for each 
methodology were applied to get the final sample for the analysis. However, the market 
value of common stocks (market capitalization) 30 trading days prior to the 
announcement day (t=-30) is used as a measure for firm size for both methodologies. For 
this reason, firms with missing market capitalization data on that day are excluded from 
the study.  For the market capitalization methodology, change in market value of the 
common stocks for different intervals around the announcement day (t=0) is used to 
capture market reaction to the joint venture announcements. Therefore, around day t = 0, 
there must be market capitalization data available for the intervals of [-30,-7], [-30,0], [-
7,0], [-2,0], [0,2], and [0,7] to analyze market reaction to the joint venture announcements 
for different sub-samples. Moreover, there must be no contaminating joint venture 
announcements for each parent firm 30 trading days before and after the day of 
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announcement [-30,0,30]. For the same reason, such events are also excluded from initial 
sample, resulting in 1,897 announcements or number of 3,794 firms. Then, these 3,794 
firms’ market values are ranked from largest to smallest. Market capitalization ranking is 
ranging from $222,000 to $538 billion with mean of $ 9.8 billion and median of $681 
million.           
 To study the validity of the relative size hypothesis in joint ventures, different 
sub-samples of joint ventures were constructed. The firms in this sample were then 
categorized as “small”, “medium” or “large” parent firms according to the total market 
value of their common stock 30 trading days before the initial announcement of the joint 
venture (t=-30). Afterward, the upper 1/3 of the market capitalization rankings of the 
firms announcing joint ventures is categorized as large firms with market value of $2.7 
billion or above, the lower 1/3 of the market capitalization rankings of joint venture 
partners is categorized as small firms with market capitalization of $176 million or less, 
and finally the middle 1/3 is categorized as medium size firms with market capitalization 
of between $2.7 billion and $176 million. Next, by using this information and sample 
criteria, joint venture partners are matched in a way that small size firms announce joint 
venture with large size firms, small size firms with medium size firms, and medium size 
firms with large size firms. In all of these samples, firms with only one joint venture 
announcement are included.         
 The second methodology is to estimate abnormal returns around the 
announcement day. Abnormal returns of joint venturing parents are estimated by using 
the standard event study methodology that uses the market model. To satisfy the 
requirement of cross-sectional independence, which is a common requirement in event 
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studies to conduct test statistics, multiple announcements, except for the very first 
announcement, by the same companies are removed from the sample. This process also 
eliminates the “industry bias” due to the “over-representation problem” (McConnell and 
Nantell, 1985), which occurs when joint ventures are announced more than once by the 
same companies6. Finally, only parents with 501 days non-missing returns data around 
the announcement days (+250, 0, -250) are included since this study aims at finding 
empirical evidence for both welfare and risk effects of joint ventures that involve firms 
relatively differ in size. For both methodologies, the final samples are limited to those 
companies whose stock returns and market capitalization data are available on the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Satisfying all of these criteria resulted 
in different sample size for each sub-sample analysis.     
 The "standard event study" technique is used to test the effect of announcements 
on stock returns (see Brown and Warner, 1985). The rationality behind the event study is 
that the effects of the event will be reflected immediately in security returns. Therefore, 
measuring the impact of a specific event on security prices can be constructed in a 
relatively short time. In contrast, productivity related measures might take many periods 
of observation. The market model relates the return of any individual security to the 
return of the market portfolio. The advantage of using the market model is that it allows 
the researcher to control for the effects of market-wide fluctuations to measure daily 
abnormal returns (the market model residuals). Commonly used market portfolios are the 
S&P 500 index, the CRSP Value Weighted Index, and the CSRP Equal Weighted Index. 
                                                 
6To test for the industry bias due to over-representation, McConnell and Nantel (1985), however, construct 
a non-contaminated sample by excluding joint ventures categorized as real estate development and 
television programming, motion pictures, video games, etc. They find that the empirical results for non-
contaminated sample are very similar to those for the full sample.  
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In this study CRSP Equal Weighted Index returns is used as market returns. For any 
security j the market model is:  
jtmtjjjt RR εβα ++= ˆˆ                                                     (1) 
where, Rjt is the return on the jth security in time period t, Rmt is the market return on the 
CRSP equal weighted index, αj is an intercept assumed to be constant over the entire time 
period, βj is the systematic risk for security j, and.εjt is the error term for jth security in 
period t. 
The date of the joint venture announcement is taken as the event date and defined 
as day t = 0.  Additionally, the behavior of average abnormal returns is reported over the 
event window of days (-5, +5). Pre-event parameters are estimated from the market 
model over the period t = -250 to t = -30 days relative to the announcement date. Post-
event parameters are estimated over the period t = +30 to t = +250 days relative to the 
announcement day.  
This study tests to see if the “relative size hypothesis” holds and if risk measures 
associated with each sub-sample show any significant change after the joint venture 
announcement. For that reason, total risk is partitioned into systematic risk (βj) and 
unsystematic risk, variance of εj, Var(εj). The systematic risk is a measure of how an 
individual asset co-varies with the economy, and the unsystematic risk is a company 
specific risk and independent of the economy. Variance of daily common stock returns 
for any security j, Var(Rj), is used for total risk. To test if there is any significant change 
in all three risk measures after the announcement, change in systematic risk (∆SYS), 
unsystematic risk (∆UNSYS), and total risk (∆TOTAL) is computed as: 
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                           ∆SYS = (βj, post) - (βj, pre)  
                     ∆UNSYS = Var(εj, post) - Var(εj, pre)  
                      ∆TOTAL= Var(Rj, post) - Var(Rj, pre)  
The daily abnormal returns are computed as the deviation of realized returns from the 
expected return over the event window of day t = -30 to day t = 30. The abnormal return 
for firm j on day t is computed as:         
      mtjjjtjt RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=                                                     (2) 
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The maximum likelihood estimate of standard deviation ( jtS ) is computed as: 























VS                            (4) 
where,  
Rmt = market return on the CRSP equal-weighted index in time period t. 
Rm = mean market return in the estimation period. 
Vj
2 = residual variance of security j.  
D = number of days in the estimation period.  
N = number of announcements in the sample. 
Rjt = return on security j for period t. 
                                                 
7 For the same sub-samples, daily average excess return (AER) based on equal-weighted market index is 
also employed for robustness check. The findings are reported in the Appendix section. 
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The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the market model 
parameters α and β over the period t = -250 days to t = -30 days relative to the 
announcement day. The standardized t statistic is applied to test the hypothesis that 
standardized average abnormal returns equal zero. In order to make sure that there is no 
outlier effect, the binomial sign test (B-value) is also employed to test that the proportion 
of positive (negative) abnormal returns expected under the null hypothesis is 0.50. The B-
values are estimated as (S-PN)/√P(1-P)N ~ N(0,1) where N is the number of 
announcements in the sample, P is the proportion of positive average abnormal returns 
under the null hypothesis (0.50) and S is the number of positive average residuals 
(Waheed and Mathur, 1995).   
Finally to investigate validity of the size effect, three different sub-samples of 
joint venture announcing partners are constructed. The sub-samples consist of those firms 
that are relatively different in size, such as small vs. large, small vs. medium, and 
medium vs. large. The next step is to analyze the riskiness of the joint venture 
announcements for the sub-samples. The empirical results and the test statistics are 
presented in section three. 
3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1. Analysis of Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel A in Tables 1 to 6 shows daily standardized average abnormal returns 
(AAR), the Z-values, number of companies with positive daily average abnormal returns 
(POSAVG), the proportion of daily average positive abnormal returns (%), sample size 
(N), and the binomial sign test statistic (B-value) for two-parent joint ventures. The Z-
value is the standardized t statistic to test the hypothesis that the daily average abnormal 
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returns equal zero. The binomial sign test (B-value) is used to test if the proportion of 
positive abnormal returns in the test period is significantly different from the proportion 
of positive abnormal returns expected under the null hypothesis (0.50). The binomial sign 
test is employed to check if a few outliers affect the abnormal returns. 
In panel B of Tables 1 to 6, ∆SYS refers to change in systematic risk, ∆UNSYS 
refers change in unsystematic risk, ∆TOTAL refers to change in total risk, N+ refers to the 
number of companies for which there is an increase in the risk measures after the joint 
venture announcement, and N- refers the number of companies for which there is a 
decrease in the three risk measures after the joint venture announcement. Associated test 
statistics - the Wilcoxon ranked sign test (Z) and paired t-test - are provided in panel B. 
The one-tail paired t- test statistic tests whether the mean difference for each measure of 
risk is different from zero. To check if change in the risk measures ∆SYS, ∆UNSYS, 
∆TOTAL, is not due to a few outliers, the Wilcoxon median signed rank test statistics are 
also presented8.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows the standardized daily average abnormal returns (AAR) 
and the associated test statistics for the sample of small size parents when they sign joint 
venture contract with large size parents. The AAR on the day of announcement is 65 
percent, which is significant at the one percent level. This indicates that, the shareholders 
of the small size partners experience highly significant positive abnormal returns at the 
time of such announcements when they partner with large size firms. Since 89 (i.e., 59.73 
%) of 149 announcements have positive abnormal returns, this finding is not due to a few 
outlier effects. The announcement day t = 0 is the only day on which more than 50 
                                                 
2 (see for example, Siegel & Castellan; Nonparametric Statistics, 2nd ed.; p.90). 
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percent of the small firms observe highly significant positive returns. On day t = -2, small 
firms earn significantly positive 19.8 percent returns. This finding can be attributed to the 
news leakage effect that the shareholders of some firms may have gained access to the 
information about the joint venture two days before the announcement. The AARs after 
the announcement day are negative and not significantly different from zero except for 
day t = 5. On this day, the AAR is negative 18 percent and it is significant at the five 
percent level. 
Table 1: Daily standardized average abnormal returns for the  “SMALL” firms in 
the sample of joint ventures where small firms sign contract with large firms. 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.014    -0.176 71 47.65 149   -0.573 
-4  0.014     0.167 68 45.64 149   -1.065 
-3 -0.033    -0.397 61 40.94 149   -2.212** 
-2  0.198     2.419** 76 51.01 149     0.246 
-1  0.122     1.490 76 51.01 149     0.246 
 0  0.645     7.870*** 89 59.73 149     2.376*** 
 1 -0.179    -2.186** 61 40.94 149    -2.212** 
 2 -0.109    -1.328 60 40.27 149    -2.376** 
 3 -0.120    -1.467 64 42.95 149    -1.720* 
 4 -0.007    -0.091 73 48.99 149    -0.246 
 5 -0.072    -0.874 61 40.94 149    -2.212** 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint venture is a risk-reducing strategy. 
Significance of the change in risks is tested using the t-statistic for means and the 





 Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 57 92 -1.70  0.044** -1.31      0.095* 
∆UNSYS 73 76 -0.11  0.455 -0.19      0.423 
∆TOTAL 73 76 -0.04  0.483 -0.21      0.416 
         ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the test statistics for change in the levels of systematic 
risk, unsystematic risk, and total risk. Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon ranked-sign test 
indicate that there is no change in total risk and unsystematic risk. However, the 
systematic risk has decreased. This shows that small firms experience a lower level of 
systematic risk when they partner with large firms.       
 Table 2 shows the results for large firms when they sign joint ventures with small 
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firms. Panel A shows that the AAR at t = 0 is positive 25 percent but not significantly 
different from zero. The AARs for the other days, except for day t = -5, are also not 
significantly different from zero. The sign test statistic for day t = 0 also shows that 
proportion of firms with positive AAR is not significantly different from 50 percent, 
indicating that the positive AAR on day t = 0 is due to a few outliers in the sample. In 
Panel B of Table 2, the t-test and the sign test statistics show that large partners also 
observe lower level of systematic risk and no significant change in the levels of 
unsystematic and total risk after the announcement. However, lower level of significance 
indicated by the sign test (10.2 percent significance level) provides weak evidence that 
large firms experience lower systematic risk after the announcement. The empirical 
results in Table 1 and Table 2 support the relative size hypothesis that gain from joint 
ventures is inversely related to the firm size.  
Table 2: Daily standardized average abnormal returns for the “LARGE” firms in 
the sample of joint ventures where large firms sign contract with small firms. 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.365    -1.674*   5 23.81 21    -2.400** 
-4 -0.277    -1.270   8 38.10 21    -1.091 
-3 0.126     0.577 15 71.43 21     1.964** 
-2 -0.099    -0.453   9 42.86 21    -0.655 
-1 -0.121    -0.552 10 47.62 21    -0.218 
 0 0.247     1.130 13 61.90 21     1.091 
 1 0.094     0.430 12 57.14 21     0.655 
 2 0.132     0.604 11 52.38 21     0.218 
 3 0.347     1.588 12 57.14 21     0.655 
 4 -0.114    -0.524   7 33.33 21    -1.528 
 5 -0.357    -1.635   5 23.81 21    -2.400** 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint venture is a risk-reducing strategy. 
Significance of the change in risks is tested using the t-statistic for means and the 





 Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 10 11    -1.27 0.102*    -1.54 0.069* 
∆UNSYS 11 10 0.23  0.410 0.73    0.238 
∆TOTAL 12 9 0.89  0.187 0.89    0.187 
         ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 refers to the sample where small size firms enter into joint venture with 
medium size firms. Panel A shows that small firm’s AAR on day t = 0 is 51 percent and 
significant at the 1 percent level. On the other hand, the proportion of firms with positive 
abnormal return on day t = 0 is 58 percent, but not significantly different from 50 percent. 
However, when small firms enter into joint venture with large firms, the AAR is 65 
percent at t = 0, which is higher than the case when small firms choose medium size firms 
to enter into joint venture agreement (51 percent). The results in Panel B show that the 
there is no significant change in systematic, unsystematic, and total risks. This indicates 
that small firms do not experience any risk-sharing benefits when they joint venture with 
medium size firms.  
Table 3: Daily standardized average abnormal returns for the  “SMALL” parent in 
the sample of joint ventures where small firms sign contract with medium size firms. 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.037   -0.341 39 46.43 84     -0.655 
-4 0.161    1.474 42 50.00 84      0.000 
-3 0.047    0.429 38 45.24 84     -0.873 
-2 0.153    1.406 39 46.43 84     -0.655 
-1 0.092    0.839 42 50.00 84      0.000 
 0 0.507    4.651*** 49 58.33 84      1.528 
 1 0.247    2.261** 39 46.43 84     -0.655 
 2 0.043    0.396 38 45.24 84     -0.873 
 3 -0.152   -1.392 42 50.00 84      0.000 
 4 0.135    1.236 37 44.05 84     -1.091 
 5 -0.215   -1.971** 37 44.05 84     -1.091 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint venture is a risk-reducing strategy. 
Significance of the change in risks is tested using the t-statistic for means and the 





 Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 39 45    1.06 0.145 0.54 0.294 
∆UNSYS 39 45  -0.39 0.349 -0.90 0.184 
∆TOTAL 41 43   0.29 0.387 -0.82 0.207 
          ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the results for medium size firms when they enter into 
joint venture with small size firms. The AAR at day t = 0 is 11.5 percent but it is not 
significantly different from zero. On day t = 0, the AAR for small firms (51%, significant 
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at the 1% level) is higher than the AAR for medium size firms (12%, not significant). 
This finding is also another supporting evidence for the relative size hypothesis predicts 
inverse relationship between the stock market reaction to a joint venture announcement 
and the firm size relative to its partner. In Panel B of Table 4, both the sign test and t-test 
statistics show that medium size partners observe decrease in systematic risk. However, 
the test statistics indicate that medium size firms do not experience any reduction in 
unsystematic and total risk levels.  
 
Table 4: Daily standardized average abnormal returns for the “MEDIUM” size 
firms in the sample of joint ventures where medium size firms sign contract with 
small firms. 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 0.068  0.497 24 45.28 53    -0.687 
-4 -0.088 -0.637 23 43.40 53    -0.962 
-3 -0.127 -0.924 21 39.62 53    -1.511 
-2 -0.122 -0.888 22 41.51 53    -1.236 
-1 0.059  0.432 30 56.60 53     0.962 
 0 0.115  0.836 29 54.72 53     0.687 
 1 0.147  1.071 29 54.72 53     0.687 
 2 -0.102 -0.741 26 49.06 53    -0.137 
 3 -0.107 -0.781 24 45.28 53    -0.687 
 4 -0.183 -1.335 20 37.74 53    -1.786 
 5 0.231    1.685* 31 58.49 53     1.236 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint venture is a risk-reducing strategy. 
Significance of the change in risks is tested using the t-statistic for means and the 





 Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 20 33 
    -2.43 
  
0.007*** -2.49   0.008*** 
∆UNSYS 27 26     -0.09   0.463  0.20   0.420 
∆TOTAL 27 26     -0.25   0.400 -0.34   0.367 
          ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5 shows the results for medium size firms when they joint venture with 
large size firms (medium vs. large). The AAR on day t = 0 is 71 percent and significant at 
the one percent level, indicating that shareholders of the medium size firms experience 
highly significant positive abnormal returns when they partner with large firms. Since 68 
percent of the announcements show positive abnormal returns, this finding cannot be 
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attributed to any outlier effect. After day t = 0, all AARs are negative and not 
significantly different from zero. In Panel B of Table 5, both test statistics indicate that 
there is no significant change in all three risk measures, indicating that medium size firms 
do not experience any risk-sharing benefits when they partner with large firms. 
Table 5: Daily standardized average abnormal returns for “MEDIUM” size firms in 
the sample of joint ventures where medium size firms sign contact with large firms. 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.088    -0.875 45 45.92 98     -0.808 
-4 0.079     0.780 53 54.08 98      0.808 
-3 -0.057    -0.564 49 50.00 98      0.000 
-2 -0.026    -0.254 46 46.94 98     -0.606 
-1 -0.017    -0.169 53 54.08 98      0.808 
 0 0.712     7.047*** 67 68.37 98      3.637*** 
 1 -0.037    -0.366 42 42.86 98     -1.414 
 2 -0.082    -0.813 39 39.80 98     -2.020* 
 3 -0.072    -0.717 43 43.88 98     -1.212 
 4 -0.013    -0.127 50 51.02 98      0.202 
 5 -0.008    -0.080 38 38.78 98     -2.222 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint venture is a risk-reducing strategy. 
Significance of the change in risks is tested using the t-statistic for means and the 





 Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 43 55 -1.08 0.141 -0.78 0.219 
∆UNSYS 49 49  0.39 0.349   0.85 0.198 
∆TOTAL 51 47  0.85 0.197   1.04 0.149 
          ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6 shows the results for the sample of joint ventures where large firms 
partner with medium size firms. On the day of announcement, the AAR is 13.5 percent 
and not significant. Similarly, all AARs on the other days of the event window are not 
significantly positive except for day t = -2. On this day, the AAR is positive 41 percent 
and significant at the 10 percent level. However, the sign test shows that proportion of 
firms with positive AAR is not significantly different from 50 percent, indicating that the 
positive and significant AAR on day t = -2 can be attributed to some outliers. Because the 
sample size (n=22) is not very large, this is probably the most reasonable explanation for 
this anomaly. The AAR on day t = 1 is negative 37 percent and significant at the 10 
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percent level. On this day, the sign test shows that percentage of firms with positive AAR 
is significantly less than 50 percent.  
Hence, the findings in Table 5 and Table 6 show that large firms earn, on average, 
insignificant 13.5 percent abnormal return whereas medium size firms earn significant 71 
percent abnormal return. Again this shows that the relative size hypothesis holds when 
medium size parent firms enter into joint ventures with large size firms. In Panel B of 
Table 6, the test statistics show that large firms experience an increase in all three risk 
measures, indicating that large firms do not share risk when they partner medium size 
firms. As shown in Table 5, medium size firms also experience no change in all three risk 
levels. That is, there is no risk-sharing benefit when joint venture is signed between large 
and medium size firms.  
Table 6: Daily standardized average abnormal returns for “LARGE” firms in the 
sample of joint ventures where large firms sign contract with medium size firms. 
Panel A 
Day (t) AAR Z POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.062     -0.291   9 40.91 22     -0.853 
-4 -0.290     -1.360   7 31.82 22     -1.706* 
-3 0.146      0.683 15 68.18 22      1.706* 
-2 0.414      1.944* 12 54.55 22      0.426 
-1 -0.092     -0.430   9 40.91 22     -0.853 
 0 0.135      0.635 11 50.00 22      0.000 
 1 -0.374     -1.754*   5 22.73 22     -2.558** 
 2 0.281      1.319 13 59.09 22      0.853 
 3 0.108      0.508 11 50.00 22      0.000 
 4 0.033      0.153   9 40.91 22     -0.853 
 5 -0.181     -0.849 10 45.45 22     -0.426 
Panel B: Testing the hypothesis that joint venture is a risk-reducing strategy. 
Significance of the change in risks is tested using the t-statistic for means and the 





 Z p-value t p-value 
∆SYS 16 6 2.26** 0.012 2.40** 0.013 
∆UNSYS 14 8 2.16** 0.015 2.37** 0.013 
∆TOTAL 15 7 2.19** 0.014 2.40** 0.012 





3.2. Analysis of Market Capitalization  
Market Capitalization refers to total market value of a company’s outstanding 
common stocks, calculated as the current stock price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding. It is another way of examining the effects of joint venture announcements on 
shareholder’s wealth. To do this, percentage change in firms’ market value for different 
intervals around the announcement day t = 0 is calculated. In this section, joint venturing 
firms are grouped based on the same criteria described in section 2: small vs. large, small 
vs. medium, and medium vs. large groups9.  
Tables 7 to 9 present the results for each sub-sample. In the tables, N refers to 
sample size for each given interval, N+ refers to the number of parents with an increase in 
market value of their common stocks, N- refers to the number of parents with a decrease 
in market value of their common stocks, % is for percentage change in market value of 
common stocks10. The one-tailed t-test statistic and the associated p-values are used to 
test the hypothesis that the mean percentage change in market capitalization of relatively 
smaller parents is significantly greater than that of relatively larger parents.  
 Table 7 provides the results for the sub-sample where small firms announce joint 
venture with large firms. For any interval up to the announcement day t = 0, the mean 
percentage gain in market capitalization for small firms is significantly greater than that 
of large firms. The interval of [0,2] shows that small size firms, on average, experience 
                                                 
9 Another way to examine the effects of joint venture announcements on shareholders’ wealth, within the 
context of relative size hypothesis, is to measure cross-sectional average of dollar gains when relatively 
different size firms sign joint venture contract. Change in market value from day t = -1 to day t = 0 is also 
used to measure dollar gains from entering into joint ventures. The results are reported in the Appendix 
section. 
10 For some intervals, the total sample size (N) may be different from the total number of the firms with 
positive (N+) and negative change (N-) in the market value of common equity. This is because some firms 
may not observe any change in the market value of their equities during that period of time. 
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negative 0.2 percent decrease in market value of common stocks whereas large firms gain 
positive 0.1 percent increase in their market valuation of common stocks. Also, seven 
trading days after the announcement, interval [0,7], small firms observe no change in 
market value whereas large firms experience 0.3 percent increase in value. However, the 
t-test statistics for the intervals after the announcement show that there is no significant 
difference between small and large size firms in terms of percentage change in market 
capitalization.  
Table 7: Analysis of the change in market capitalization around the 
announcement day (t=0) for the sample of joint ventures where small size 
firms sign contract with large size firms. 
 







[-30,-7] 417 206 210 3.4 1.5 1.60* 0.054 
[-30,0] 417 241 176 10.5 2.1 5.38*** 0.000 
[-7,0] 409 241 167 7.1 0.5 6.80*** 0.000 
[-2,0] 409 247 160 4.7 0.1 6.36*** 0.000 
[0,2] 402 187 212 -0.2 0.1 -0.72 0.237 
[0,7] 402 175 226 0 0.3 -0.39 0.347 
           ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8 presents the results for the joint the small firms when they joint venture 
with medium size firms. Again, for any interval up to the announcement day, mean 
percentage gain in market capitalization for small firms is significantly greater than mean 
percentage gain in market capitalization for medium size firms. For the interval of [0,2], 
there is no significant difference between medium and large size firms’ percentage gain. 
Moreover, mean percent change in each parent’s market capitalization separately is also 
not significantly different from zero11. Interval of [0,7] shows that large firms, on 
average, experience positive 1.04 percent increase in market capitalization whereas 
                                                 
11 The t-test statistics to test for the hypothesis that mean percent change in market capitalization is 
different from zero are not reported but significance levels, if significant, are marked on the summary table 
presented in the appendix. 
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medium size firms experience negative 0.05 percent decrease. This difference is 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
Table 8: Analysis of the change in market capitalization around the 
announcement day (t=0) for the sample of where small size firms sign 
contract with medium size firms. 
 







[-30,-7] 380 192 187 4.5 1.7 1.89** 0.029 
[-30,0] 380 211 168 10.6 2.1 4.17*** 0.000 
[-7,0] 373 225 147 6 0.7 3.99*** 0.000 
[-2,0] 378 227 150 4.3 0.7 3.35*** 0.000 
[0,2] 383 180 199 0.53 0.55 -0.03 0.487 
[0,7] 383 176 206 -0.05 1.04 -1.76** 0.039 




Table 9: Analysis of the change in market capitalization around the 
announcement day (t=0) for the sample of joint ventures joint ventures where 
medium size firms sign contract with large size firms. 
 







[-30,-7] 419 217 202 3.8 1.1  2.29*** 0.011 
[-30,0] 419 237 182 6.9 1.7  3.72*** 0.000 
[-7,0] 432 252 180 3.2 0.7  3.99*** 0.000 
[-2,0] 437 255 181 1.9   -0.002  5.83*** 0.000 
[0,2] 451 214 237  -0.03   -0.008 -0.06 0.475 
[0,7] 451 198 253     -0.2   0.08 -0.56 0.289 
           ***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Table 9 is for the sub-sample where medium size firms announce joint venture 
with large firms. For each interval up to the announcement day, small firms gain more 
than large firms in terms of percentage change in their caps. Medium size firms loose -
0.03 percent and -0.2 percent in value during the intervals of [0,2] and [0,7], respectively. 
On the other hand, for the same intervals, large firms loose –0.008 % during the interval 
of [0, 2] and gain 0.08 percent in value during the interval of [0,7]. However, these 
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gains/losses in market value are not significantly different from zero for both medium 
and large size parents.  
For all sub-samples, the above mentioned-results consistent with the expectation 
are indicative of positive market reaction to a relatively smaller firm’s joint venture 
announcement This may be due to “synergistic” gains resulting from sharing 
complementary skills and assets (McConnell and Nantell, 1985), or due to anticipation 
that joint ventures provide small firms access to resources from which they may 
otherwise be excluded, or due the validation of smaller firm by its larger partner that 
sends positive signal to the market about small firm’s strength and potentials (Mohanram 
and Nanda, 1996).  
4. Conclusion 
This study finds very strong empirical evidence for the relative size hypothesis 
predicts that the stock market reaction to a joint venture announcement is inversely 
related to firm size relative to its partner. To test the relative size hypothesis in joint 
ventures, joint venture parents are categorized as “small”, “medium” or “large” size 
parents in the joint venture according to their market capitalization rankings. Then, these 
firms are matched with their partners to construct three sub-samples in which small firms 
partner with large firms, small firms partner with medium size firms, and medium size 
firms partner with large size firms in a joint venture agreement. 
For all three sub-samples, the abnormal return analysis based on the market model 
parameter estimates shows that, shareholders of smaller firms earn highly significant and 
larger abnormal returns on the announcement day, between approximately 51% and 71%.  
However, shareholders of relatively larger firms in all three sub-samples experience 
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positive but not significant abnormal returns at the time of such announcements, between 
12% and 25%. The largest abnormal return on the day of announcement (71%) is 
observed for medium size firms when they enter into joint venture with large firms, and 
the smallest abnormal return on the announcement day (12%, not significant) is observed 
for medium size firms when they enter into joint ventures with small firms. Since the 
binomial sign test statistics show that proportion of relatively larger firms in all sub-
samples is not significantly different from 50 percent, the abnormal return figures for 
relatively large firms can also be attributed to some outliers. Therefore, the empirical 
findings evidence that abnormal returns based on the market model support the relative 
size hypothesis 
The support for the relative size hypothesis is also found when the market 
capitalization analysis is used. The specific intervals, [-30, 0], [-7, 0], and [-2, 0], show 
that the percentage gain in market capitalization is significantly greater for relatively 
smaller firms as compare to relatively larger firms- approximately between 3.4% and 
10.6 % for relatively smaller firms, and between –0.002 % and 2.1% for relatively larger 
firms. After the announcement, the change in market capitalization is not significantly 
different from zero for firms of any size in all three sub-samples.  
The risk analysis between small and large size parents shows that the systematic 
risk for both parents decreases while unsystematic and total risk levels remain the same. 
Secondly, when the joint venture occurs between small and medium size parents, the 
medium size parent benefits from a lower level of systematic risk while the small parent 
displays no change in systematic risk. Both small and medium size parents do not 
observe any change in unsystematic and total risks. Finally, in the case medium and large 
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size parents, medium firms show no change in all three risk measures large firms observe 












































A1. Summary of Tables 1 to 9 Presented in Section 3 of Chapter 2. 
 
Table A1: Summary of abnormal returns and risk analysis for each joint venture category 
Panel A  






Small      vs.          Large 
(n=149)                 (n=21) 
Small      vs.   Medium 
(n=84)               (n=53) 
Medium   vs.      Large 















∆SYS Decrease Decrease ♠ No change Decrease No change Increase 
∆UNSYS No change No change No change No change No change Increase 
∆Total No change No change No change No change No change Increase 
 
Panel B: Mean percentage change in market capitalization for each partner in each joint 
venture category  
Interval 
Small         vs.       Large 
(%)                             (%) 
Small     vs.    Medium 
(%)                        (%) 
Medium   vs.      Large 
(%)                         (%) 
[-30, -7]     3.4*** 1.54***  4.5*** 1.7*** 3.8*** 1.1** 
[-30, 0]    10.5*** 2.07*** 10.6*** 2.1*** 6.9*** 1.7** 
[-7, 0]    7.1*** 0.46**  6*** 0.65* 3.2***  0.65** 
[-2, 0]    4.7*** 0.10   4.3*** 0.7*** 1.9*** -0.002  
[0, 2]   -0.2  0.08   0.53 0.55** -0.03  -0.01  
[0, 7]    0.002 0.28  -0.05 1.04*** -0.2 0.08 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively. 









A2. Cross-sectional Average of Dollar Gains 
 
 
Table A2: Dollar gains on the day of announcement (t = 0) relative to one day before the 
announcement day (t = -1) for different sub-samples where same size firms and relatively 
different size firms establish joint ventures. 




Category Sample N 
Mean 
(000s) Mean% Median 
Median
% 




























































Panel B: Dollar gains for the sub-samples where same size firms establish joint ventures. 
 
Medium vs. 
Medium MM  72  $9,388  1.58  5,931  0.84 
Small vs. Small SS  120  $566  2.21  0  0 
Large vs. Large LL  48  $-784 -0.43 -2,685 -0.04 
 
Another way to assess the effects of joint venture announcements on shareholder wealth within 
the context of relative size hypothesis is to measure cross-sectional average of dollar gains. The 
dollar gain for each security is measured by the change in market value of stocks from day t = -1 
to announcement day t = 0. Table A2 shows mean dollar gains, median dollar gains, mean 
percentage dollar gain (mean%) and the median of percentage dollar gains in market value 
(median%). The results in Panel A show that the mean percentage gain in market value is greater 
for relatively smaller partners, supporting the relative size hypothesis. Panel A also shows that the 
mean dollar gains for relatively smaller partner is less than that of relatively larger partner except 
for small size firms that establish joint venture with medium size firms. But again medium size 
firms have larger median dollar gain than that of small size firms. Overall, however, relatively 
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larger dollar gain associated with relatively much smaller mean percentage gain in market value 
is a result of the sample that includes very large firms.  
 
A3. Daily Average Excess Returns (AER) Based on Equal-weighted Market Index 
 
 
Table A3: Daily average excess returns (AER) based on equal-weighted market 
index on the day of announcement (t = 0) for different sub-samples where same 
size and relatively different size firms establish joint ventures. 
 
Panel A: Daily average excess returns for relatively different size firms 
 











































































Panel B: Daily average excess returns and associated t-test statistics for the same 
size firms. 
Medium vs. Medium MM 72  0.014*** 0.037  3.13 0.003 
Small vs. Small SS 120  0.022*** 0.081  2.91 0.004 
Large vs. Large BB 48 -0.002 0.022 -0.74 0.465 
 
 
 Panel A of Table A3 presents daily average excess returns (AERs) based on 
equal-weighted market index for samples where relatively different size firms establish 
joint ventures. For all three joint venture categories (small-large, small-medium, and 
medium-large), the findings show that relatively smaller firms earn, on average, 
significantly positive and higher excess returns on the announcement day (t = 0). On the 
other hand, AERs for relatively larger firms are not significantly different from zero. 
Even though the magnitudes of excess returns based on equal-weighted market index are 
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different from abnormal returns based on the market model estimates, direction of the 
results did not change. That is, the relative size hypothesis is supported by both market 
excess returns (AERs) based on equal-weighted market index and abnormal returns (AARs) 
based on the market model estimates. Panel B shows findings for samples where same size firms 
(small-small, medium-medium and large-large) establish joint ventures. The AERs for both 
medium and small joint venture groups are positive and significant. However, the AER is 
negative (-0.002) and not significant when a large size firm establishes joint venture with another 
large size firm. 
 
 
A4. Daily Average Excess Returns Based on Equal-weighted Market Index for the    
       Same Sub-samples Presented in Tables 1 to 6 in Section 3 of Chapter 2.  
 
 
Table A4: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “SMALL” firms in the sample of joint ventures where small size 
firms sign contract with large size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5  0.005  1.190 69 46.31 149 -0.901 
-4  0.000 -0.076 71 47.65 149 -0.573 
-3  0.000  0.017 64 42.95 149 -1.720* 
-2  0.007*  1.824 78 52.35 149  0.573 
-1  0.007  1.163 74 49.66 149 -0.082 
 0  0.034***  4.144 91 61.07 149  2.703*** 
 1 -0.008* -1.693 58 38.93 149 -2.703*** 
 2 -0.004 -1.039 64 42.95 149 -1.720* 
 3 -0.007 -1.468 65 43.62 149 -1.557 
 4  0.004  0.665 69 46.31 149 -0.901 
















Table A5: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “LARGE” firms in the sample of joint ventures where large size 
firms sign contract with small size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.004 -1.301 7 33.33 21 -1.52 
-4 -0.003 -0.885 7 33.33 21 -1.528 
-3  0.002  0.641 13 61.90 21  1.091 
-2 -0.003 -0.763 9 42.86 21 -0.655 
-1  0.000 -0.001 10 47.62 21 -0.218 
 0  0.003  0.988 13 61.90 21  1.091 
 1  0.002  0.529 11 52.38 21  0.218 
 2  0.003  0.835 12 57.14 21  0.655 
 3  0.005  1.006 11 52.38 21  0.218 
 4 -0.002 -0.595 7 33.33 21 -1.528 







Table A6: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “SMALL” firms in the sample of joint ventures where small firms 
sign contract with medium size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.004 -0.794 38 45.24 84 -0.873 
-4  0.007  1.223 39 46.43 84 -0.655 
-3  0.006  0.737 34 40.48 84 -1.746 
-2  0.005  1.082 39 46.43 84 -0.655 
-1  0.000  0.074 39 46.43 84 -0.655 
 0  0.022***  2.926 48 57.14 84  1.309 
 1  0.011  1.492 39 46.43 84 -0.655 
 2 -0.001 -0.152 37 44.05 84 -1.091 
 3 -0.006 -0.890 37 44.05 84 -1.091 
 4  0.006  0.968 36 42.86 84 -1.309 















Table A7: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “MEDIUM” firms in the sample of joint ventures where medium 
firms sign contract with small size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5  0.002  0.402 24 45.28 53 -0.687 
-4 -0.001 -0.229 23 43.40 53 -0.962 
-3 -0.005 -1.564 20 37.74 53 -1.786 
-2 -0.002 -0.551 23 43.40 53 -0.962 
-1  0.002  0.590 28 52.83 53  0.412 
 0  0.005  1.234 28 52.83 53  0.412 
 1  0.004  0.871 30 56.60 53  0.962 
 2  0.000 -0.033 26 49.06 53 -0.137 
 3 -0.001 -0.275 23 43.40 53 -0.962 
 4 -0.005 -1.424 19 35.85 53 -2.060 






Table A8: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “MEDIUM” firms in the sample of joint ventures where medium 
firms sign contract with large size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.001 -0.402 43 43.88 98 -1.212 
-4  0.003  1.332 52 53.06 98  0.606 
-3 -0.001 -0.596 46 46.94 98 -0.606 
-2  0.000 -0.024 46 46.94 98 -0.606 
-1  0.000 -0.131 54 55.10 98  1.010 
 0  0.021***  3.607 67 68.37 98  3.637 
 1  0.000  0.006 44 44.90 98 -1.010 
 2  0.000 -0.204 40 40.82 98 -1.818 
 3  0.000 -0.147 47 47.96 98 -0.404 
 4  0.001  0.318 50 51.02 98  0.202 
















Table A9: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “LARGE” firms in the sample of joint ventures where large firms 
sign contract with medium size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.001 -0.215 10 45.45 22 -0.426 
-4 -0.005* -1.839 8 36.36 22 -1.279 
-3  0.002  0.821 13 59.09 22  0.853 
-2  0.007*  1.737 12 54.55 22  0.426 
-1  0.000  0.042 11 50.00 22  0.000 
 0  0.003  0.788 10 45.45 22 -0.426 
 1 -0.008* -1.743 6 27.27 22 -2.132 
 2  0.004  0.869 13 59.09 22  0.853 
 3  0.003  1.050 14 63.64 22  1.279 
 4  0.000  0.103 9 40.91 22 -0.853 







Table A10: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “SMALL” firms in the sample of joint ventures where small firms 
sign contract with small size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.002 -0.297 59 49.17 120 -0.183 
-4  0.000  0.032 60 50.00 120  0.000 
-3  0.003  0.573 52 43.33 120 -1.461 
-2  0.000 -0.078 61 50.83 120  0.183 
-1  0.001  0.134 51 42.50 120 -1.643 
 0  0.022***  2.912 62 51.67 120  0.365 
 1  0.008  1.566 65 54.17 120  0.913 
 2  0.005  0.860 57 47.50 120 -0.548 
 3  0.005  1.026 54 45.00 120 -1.095 
 4 -0.002 -0.627 48 40.00 120 -2.191 












Table A11: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “MEDIUM” firms in the sample of joint ventures where medium 
size firms sign contract with medium size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.006** -1.996 27 37.50 72 -2.121 
-4  0.002  0.542 34 47.22 72 -0.471 
-3 -0.002 -0.758 30 41.67 72 -1.414 
-2  0.004  1.064 39 54.17 72  0.707 
-1 -0.001 -0.350 33 45.83 72 -0.707 
 0  0.014***  3.131 43 59.72 72  1.650 
 1  0.001  0.339 40 55.56 72  0.943 
 2 -0.007* -1.930 29 40.28 72 -1.650 
 3  0.000 -0.037 33 45.83 72 -0.707 
 4  0.003  0.816 38 52.78 72  0.471 






Table A12: Daily average excess returns based on equal-weighted market 
index for “LARGE” firms in the sample of joint ventures where large size 
firms sign contract with large size firms. 
Day (t) 
AER t-value POSAVG % N B-value 
-5 -0.004 -1.213 22 45.83 48 -0.577 
-4  0.004  1.310 27 56.25 48  0.866 
-3  0.004  0.680 23 47.92 48 -0.289 
-2  0.003  0.579 26 54.17 48  0.577 
-1 -0.007* -1.729 19 39.58 48 -1.443 
 0 -0.002 -0.737 22 45.83 48 -0.577 
 1  0.001  0.414 22 45.83 48 -0.577 
 2 -0.005 -1.448 20 41.67 48 -1.155 
 3  0.001  0.250 23 47.92 48 -0.289 
 4 -0.004 -0.855 21 43.75 48 -0.866 
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Chapter 3: Third Essay: 
The Relationship between Industry Concentration and Mode of 
Expansion: The Case of Joint Ventures and IPOs 
 
Abstract 
This study aims at examining the effects of industry concentration on the choice of expansion 
modes, IPO vs. JV. The literature related to this study can be partitioned into two groups. The 
first group focuses on the ownership choice between JV and wholly-owned subsidiary modes of 
entry. On the other hand, the second group studies the effects of IPO announcements on rival 
firms within the same industry. However, there has not been any study on the choice of expansion 
mode between joint ventures and IPOs under different degrees of industry concentration. For this, 
two different hypotheses are developed and tested: The first hypothesis states that when target 
industry is highly concentrated, the preferred mode of expansion should be join venture. The 
second hypothesis states that when negative competitive effects are stronger than positive 
information effects, IPO firms will choose highly concentrated industry. This study finds 
empirical support for the second hypothesis but not for the first one. The empirical findings show 
that both IPO and joint venture companies tend to choose highly concentrated industries. The 
welfare effect of both IPO and joint venture announcements on shareholders’ wealth is also 
examined. The findings document that in the longer time period, cumulative average excess 












Chapter 3: The Relationship between Industry Concentration and 
Mode of Expansion: The Case of Joint Ventures and IPOs 
1. Introduction 
 The main objective of this paper is to investigate the industry effect on the choice 
of expansion mode between joint ventures and IPOs. The vast majority of previous 
studies has focused on the mode of entry12 into foreign markets (Anderson and Coughlan, 
1986; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hennart, 1991; Hennart 
and Larimo, 1998; Buckley and Casson, 1998; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000). Those studies have extensively used transaction costs theory to explain 
the ownership choice between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) modes 
of entry. This literature suggests that a joint venture should be the preferred mode of 
entry to a wholly-owned subsidiary when joint venture is used to combine 
complementary inputs held by two separate firms, and when the market for both inputs 
has high transaction costs. The transaction costs theory posits that when the desired assets 
can not be separated from unwanted ones, and when a complete takeover increases 
management costs by generating adverse impact on management team’s incentive in the 
acquired firm to maximize the residual, forming a joint venture to obtain the right to use 
the assets is more efficient than complete takeover. It would be more costly to obtain the 
necessary assets through replication or full acquisition (Hennart, 1991).  
                                                 
12 Choice of entry mode refers to the initial preferences of MNEs when they decide to enter into foreign 
markets. The literature usually classifies entry mode choice decisions according to the amount of equity 
invested. Usually joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries (e.g., acquisitions and greenfield 
investments) represent equity market entries. Generally amount of equity invested determines the degree of 
control and the mode of entry into foreign markets. 
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Another body of literature studies the impact of IPO announcements on rivals 
within the same industry. In general, these studies find that the impact of IPO 
announcement on rivals is related to firm and industry characteristics. Majority of the 
studies in this area concentrates on industry concentration in determining the direction 
and magnitude of rivals' reaction to IPO announcements. There is a limited amount of 
study exists regarding the impact of IPO announcements on rival firms within the same 
industry. Slovin, Sushka and Ferarro (1995) examine the announcement effects of carve-
outs (initial public offerings of subsidiary equity), spin-offs and asset sell-offs on rival 
firms within the same industry and they find that rivals react negatively to IPO 
announcements. 
Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner (2001) use product market explanation for a firm's 
decision to go public (e.g., internet IPOs are not considered as product market IPOs). 
Their findings suggest that that only better quality firms will choose to go public. 
Consumers will perceive a product market IPO as a positive signal about the quality of 
IPO product. This is going to have negative effect on rival firms’ profits, since they are 
going to charge lower prices for relatively lower quality products. This is especially more 
important in less concentrated industries in which competitive factors play a major role 
for long-term success. This prediction suggests that an IPO announcement in a low 
concentration industry is going to have negative effect on rival firms. Cotei, Farhat, and 
Mukherje (2004) study informational externalities of IPO announcements on publicly 
traded firms in the same industry. Their findings suggest that venture backed IPOs 
convey positive informational externalities about the industry13. The results show that 
rivals have positive valuation effects only in response to venture backed IPOs and no 
                                                 
13 Venture backed IPO refers to IPO funded by venture capitalists 
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significant reaction in response to non-venture backed IPOs. They also report that wealth 
effects on rivals in low concentrated industries are positively related to the size of the 
IPO. Akhigbe, Borde and Whyte (2003) examine whether an industry effect exists for 
initial public offerings. They examine the effects of initial public offerings on rival firms 
under two categories i) positive information effects ii) negative competitive effects. Their 
findings indicate that degree of concentration is inversely related to rival valuation 
effects, that is, rival firms in less concentrated (more competitive) industries are exposed 
to more severe competitive effects. Additional capital raised by the IPO firm is 
considered as a threat to rivals in industries with low degree of concentration. They also 
find that large IPOs in less concentrated industries have the strongest competitive effects. 
However, they conclude that information effects and competitive effects are offsetting, 
that is, rivals’ reaction to IPO announcement is insignificant due to offsetting information 
and competitive effects.  
The literature is lacking in two important areas (in addition to mixed results on 
announcement effects of IPOs). First, to my knowledge, there has not been any study on 
the choice of ownership between joint ventures and IPOs. Second, the previous studies 
mentioned earlier do not provide any explanation for industry concentration effects on the 
choice of expansion mode between joint ventures and IPOs. They do, however, study 
industry characteristics (level of concentration to be more specific) to determine rival’s 
reaction to IPO announcements only.  
Industry concentration is also another factor that may affect the probability that a 
firm will form a joint venture to have access to resources for expansion. The higher the 
degree of concentration (less competitive), the greater the adverse impact on new entrants 
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through IPO and the greater the probability that firms will choose joint venture expansion 
mode. Because contracting a joint venture agreement with an existing large parent firm in 
a highly concentrated industry will be less opposed by other established rival firms in the 
same industry. Even if there happens to be some adverse reaction to new augmented 
market power resulting from new venture strategy, these negative reactions are  going to 
be “co-opted” by parent firms (Kogut, and Singh, 1988). When an industry is controlled 
by a few large firms (highly concentrated industry), new entrants are going to be 
intimidated and discouraged by existing big rivals from entering the industry (Caves, 
1981). Therefore firms are going to be reluctant to choose IPO as a mode of expansion 
through public equity markets. Given the reluctance of these firms toward IPO, joint 
ventures then may be the preferred mode of entry into highly concentrated industries.  
As an attempt to fill the above gaps in the literature, this paper aims at testing 
following two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: When concentration in the target industry is high, the preferred mode of 
expansion is joint venture.  
Hypothesis 2: If negative competitive effects are stronger than positive information 
effects, IPO firms tend to choose industries with high concentration level.  
 Additionally, the effects of IPO and JV announcements on shareholders’ wealth 
are also studied. For this, daily average excess returns and cumulative average excess 
returns for both IPO and JV companies are used to test for welfare effects. The results are 
presented in section three. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Data and 
methodology are presented in section two; empirical results and test statistics are in 
section three, and conclusion of the paper is in section four. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Excess Return Analysis 
The IPO sample covers the period of 1993 – 2002. The joint venture sample for 
this study is composed of companies engaged in only two-parent joint ventures over the 
period of 1993 – 2002 to be consistent with the IPO sample. The sample for both joint 
venture and IPO announcing companies was taken from the Securities Corporation 
Platinum Database. 
In the initial joint venture sample, four-digit SIC and CUSIP numbers for both 
parents and four-digit SIC numbers for joint venture were available. To study the effects 
of IPO and JV announcements on shareholders’ wealth, IPO and JV announcing 
companies are limited to those companies whose excess returns are available on the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). For that reason, CUSIP numbers in the 
original JV sample were merged with PERMNOs (permanent numbers identifying the 
companies) available in CRSP to be able to get excess returns data. These requirements 
were not needed for the IPO sample because it already had the PERMNOs and the dates 
of announcements. 
To be consistent with the IPO sample, only first time joint venture announcing 
firms were included in the final sample. If a company had more than one joint venture 
announcement, only the first announcement date was included in the sample. This 
process resulted total number of 881 companies that announced JV for the very first time 
during the period of 1993 to 2002. Moreover, for the excess returns analysis, firms must 
have 181 days of excess returns available, days t = 0 to t = +180, to be included in the 
joint venture sample. Final joint venture sample has 658 companies that met all the 
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criteria for excess returns analysis. Since returns data for IPO companies are not available 
in CRSP on the announcement day (t = 0), companies must have 180 non-missing excess 
return data available starting from one day after the announcement day (t =1 to t = 180) to 
be included in the final IPO sample. Among all IPO companies, 4215 companies met the 
criteria to be included in the final IPO sample. Distribution of the IPO and JV 
announcements based on 38 industry groups is presented in the Appendix 3. The 38 
industry groups are obtained from Kenneth French’s website. 
2.2. Industry Concentration Analysis 
 The Herfindahl Index (HI) is used as a measure for industry concentration. It has 
two advantages. First, it takes into account of all firms in an industry. Secondly, it gives 
more weight to firms with large market shares than to small firms with small market 
shares, to provide a better indication of the relative market control of the largest firms 
than can be found with the four-firm and eight firm concentration ratios14.  









where n is the number of firms in the industry with same four-digit SIC code, and si is the 
market share of firm i, and n is the number of firms in the market. Market share of an 
individual firm is the fraction of an industry’s total sales accounted for by a single 
                                                 
14 For example: If there are six firms in an industry and each one has 15 percent market share, the 
Herfindahl index is 1360. However, if one firm has 80 percent market share and remaining five firms have 
2 percent each, then the Herfindahl index is 6430. Here it is assumed that the remaining 10% is divided 
among 10 equally sized firms. On the other hand, the six-firm concentration ratio is 90 percent for both 
cases. The Herfindahl index for these two cases shows the lack of competition in the second case very 
clearly. This is due to the fact that the market shares are squared prior to being summed, giving additional 
weight to firms with larger size.  
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company in the same industry. The index is calculated for each SIC code available in 
Research Insight by using annual sales data from S&P’s Research Insight for the period 
of 1993 to 2002. The value of the HI is between 0 and 1 (or between 1000 and 10000). 
The U.S. Department of Justice uses HI to decide if a merger is anticompetitive or not. 
An HI less than 0.10 (or 1000) indicates a relatively un-concentrated industry, and the 
Department of Justice likely would not consider a proposed transaction (e.g., merger) that 
would leave the industry with HI in that range as anti-competitive. An HI between 0.1 
and 0.18 (or between 1000 and 1800) represents moderately concentrated market, and the 
Department of Justice likely would closely evaluate the competitive impact of a merger 
that would result in HI in that range. Markets having an HI greater than 0.18 (or greater 
than 1800) are considered to be highly concentrated. Transactions that increase the HI by 
more than 100 points in highly concentrated markets generally provoke scrutiny, 
although this varies from case to case15. 
 The year for which index number is calculated is the calendar year in which joint 
venture or IPO is announced. Among 881 companies that announced joint venture for the 
first time in different industries, only 726 of them had matching SIC codes and HI 
numbers calculated by using sales data from S&P’s Research Insight. However, for 
robustness check, an analysis of all announcements in the original two-parent joint 
sample during the period of 1993 to 2002, regardless of their first or subsequent 
announcements, are also conducted and results are presented appendix 3. And among 
4272 IPO announcements, 2497 of them had matching SIC and HI numbers available for 
this analysis.  
                                                 
15 For more information see Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission 
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 3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Excess Return Analysis 
One sample t-test is applied to test if daily average excess returns (AER) are significantly 
different from zero. Table 1 shows that on the day of announcement (t = 0) AER for JV 
announcing firms is 2.49 percent and it is highly significantly different from zero.  AER 
for the second day is 0.25 percent and it is not significantly different from zero. For the 
other days, AER is negative and not significantly different from zero except when t = 6, it 
is significantly negative (-0.38 percent). The findings for IPO sample show that AER at t 
= 0 is 0.2 percent and it is significant at 10 percent significance level, which is a lower 
significance level compare to significance of AER for joint venture sample on day t = 0.  
 
      ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 1 also shows that AERs for IPO sample are negative and significantly different 
from zero for days t = 2, 3 and 5. Other days they are not significant except when t = 11, 
Table 1: Daily average excess returns (AER) and t-test statistics for IPOs and Joint ventures. 
 
 JV (N=658) IPO (N=4215) 
Days 
 
AER t-test p-values AER t-test p-values 
      0  0.0249*** 8.098 0.0000 - - - 
1  0.0025 1.134 0.2572  0.00203* 1.765 0.0776 
2 -0.0010 -0.465 0.6421 -0.00223** -2.522 0.0117 
3 -0.0030 -1.436 0.1515 -0.00291*** -3.560 0.0004 
4 -0.0006 -0.287 0.7741 -0.00056 -0.662 0.5081 
5 -0.0003 -0.136 0.8917 -0.00244*** -3.018 0.0026 
6 -0.0038** -2.171 0.0303 -0.00095 -1.215 0.2245 
7 -0.0012 -0.582 0.5606  0.00037 0.465 0.6420 
8 -0.0004 -0.173 0.8627  0.00126 1.589 0.1122 
9 -0.0022 -1.315 0.1891  0.00126 1.472 0.1412 
10 -0.0024 -1.392 0.1645  0.00106 1.274 0.2029 
11 -0.0009 -0.484 0.6287  0.0015** 1.966 0.0494 
12 -0.0005 -0.214 0.8304  0.0013 1.620 0.1054 
 75 
it is 0.15 percent and significant at 5 percent significance level. These results show that 
announcement effect is greater for joint venture announcing firms. However, positive and 
significant announcement effects disappear after announcement day. 
The same analysis is applied to the cumulative average excess returns (CER) for 
both JV and IPO samples. The CERs are from CRSP and they are based on equally 
weighted market index. The results are shown in Table 2. For JV sample, CERs are all 
positive and significantly different from zero on days t = 0 to 9. After 10th day (t = 10, 11 
and 12), CERs are positive but not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, 
the CER for IPO companies is positive and significantly different from zero (0.16 
percent). However, after IPO announcement day, CERs are negative and significantly 
different from zero (except for negative and insignificant CERs on days t=11 and t=12).  
 
Table 2: Daily cumulative average excess returns (CER) and t-test statistics for 
IPOs and Joint ventures. 
 JV (N=658) IPO (N=4215) 
Days 
 
CER t-test p-values CER t-test p-values 
      0 0.0249*** 8.098 0.0000 - - - 
1 0.0274*** 6.956 0.0000  0.0016 1.391 0.1642 
2 0.0264*** 5.668 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.344 0.7310 
3 0.0220*** 4.991 0.0000 -0.0037** -2.219 0.0266 
4 0.0203*** 4.544 0.0000 -0.0046* -2.529 0.0115 
5 0.0193*** 4.214 0.0000 -0.0074*** -3.783 0.0002 
6 0.0149*** 3.184 0.0015 -0.0086*** -4.167 0.0000 
7 0.0137*** 2.645 0.0084 -0.0089*** -3.999 0.0001 
8 0.0122** 2.290 0.0223 -0.0073*** -3.170 0.0015 
9 0.0101* 1.770 0.0772 -0.0060** -2.420 0.0156 
10 0.0073 1.263 0.2072 -0.0049* -1.864 0.0624 
11 0.0054 0.946 0.3443 -0.0031 -1.118 0.2636 
12 0.0048 0.793 0.4279 -0.0018 -0.601 0.5481 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results in Table 2 show that during the twelve trading days after the announcement, 
joint venture announcing firms have positive average cumulative excess returns whereas 
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IPO announcing firms have negative average cumulative excess returns. To analyze and 
compare welfare effects of IPO and JV announcements on shareholders in a longer time 
period, cumulative average excess returns over 180 days after the announcements and test 
statistics are presented in Table 3. In Table 3, day t = 0 is announcement day for JV 
sample but it refers to first day of trading for IPO sample. The reason for this is that there 
is no data available in the CSRP on the day of IPO announcement (t = 0). But number of 
trading days is 180 for both samples (t = 0 to t = 179 for JV sample and t = 1 to t = 180 
for IPO sample). The results show that during the first seven days of trading, interval of 
[0.6], JV sample with positive 1.5 percent CER outperforms the IPO sample with 
negative 0.86 percent CER. However, after seven trading days, IPO firms have positive 
and significant excess returns except for the interval [0,179].  
 
Table 3: Cumulative average excess returns (CER) and t-test statistics for IPOs and Joint 
ventures. 
 Joint Ventures (N=658) IPO (N=4215) 
Days 
 
CER t-test p-values CER t-test p-values 
0 1 day  0.025*** 8.10 0.0001  0.0016 1.39 0.1642 
[0,1] 2 days  0.027*** 6.96 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.34 0.7310 
[0,6] 7 days  0.015*** 3.18 0.0015 -0.0086*** -3.99 0.0001 
[0,13] 14 days  0.003 0.40 0.6857  0.0056* 1.76 0.0779 
[0,20] 21 days -0.001 -0.14 0.8884  0.0248*** 6.16 0.0000 
[0,29] 30 days -0.002 -0.25 0.8025  0.0205*** 4.42 0.0001 
[0,59] 60 days -0.010 -0.70 0.4828  0.0392*** 5.22 0.0000 
[0,119] 120 days -0.011 -0.42 0.6733  0.0261** 2.27 0.0230 
[0,179] 180 days -0.005 -0.17 0.8618 -0.0232* -1.83 0.0673 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
This finding is consistent with the “speculative bubble hypothesis”. Bubbles arise when 
stocks consistently sell at prices in excess of its fundamental value. Under the speculative 
bubble hypothesis, high positive abnormal returns are attributed to speculative behaviors 
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of investors. For instance, when investors do not behave rationally, they over-react to the 
information generated by IPOs. As a result, an elevated demand for a new issue of an IPO 
could be due to over-optimistic behavior demonstrated by irrational investors. This 
creates a speculative bubble temporarily pushing stock price above its intrinsic value. 
Therefore, the speculative bubble hypothesis implies that relatively high positive excess 
returns in the short should be followed by negative long run excess returns as the bubble 
bursts later in the future. The CERs for both JV and IPO samples are presented 
graphically in appendix 3. 
 The independent samples t-test is used to test whether the means of average 
excess returns and cumulative average excess returns for JVs and IPOs are different.  The 
test results are shown in Table 4.  
 
     ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The t-test statistic shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean average excess return for IPOs (0.0001) and JVs (0.0003) with t = -0.99 and p = 
0.3231. However, there is a significant difference between cumulative mean excess 

















































returns for IPOs and JVs (with t = 16.26 and p=0.0001)16. In other words, IPOs have 
statistically significant higher cumulative mean excess returns (0.0203) than JVs (-0.009) 
during the first 180 days after the announcement. 
3.2. Industry Concentration Analysis 
A chi-square test is used to see if there is a significant relationship between two types of 
expansion mode, JV or IPO, and the degree of industry concentration measured by the 
Herfindahl index.  The Herfindahl index is calculated for any industry in which joint 
venture is established during the period of 1993 to 2002. The chi-square contingency 
table to test for independence is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Distribution of JV and IPO announcements based on three 
degrees of industry concentration: low, medium and high. 
 
 Low Medium High Total 
IPOs (observed) 





































Total (observed) 383 544 2296 3223 
Percent 11.88 16.88 71.24 100 
Chi-square test statistic = 45.45,  p-value = 0.0000 
                                                                                      
 
The chi-square test assumes that the expected value for each cell is five or higher. This 
assumption is easily met for this analysis. The JV sample in Table 5 consists of first joint 
venture announcements during the period of 1993 to 2002. The test result indicates that 
there is statistically significant relationship between the mode of expansion (IPO or JV) 
                                                 
16
 Non-parametric Wilcoxon sign test also indicates that there is significant difference between JVs and 
IPOs in their CERs (Z=12.27, p-value=0.0000). Z value for AER is -1.07 with p-value =0.2863(two-sided) 
14.31 (one sided). The test statistic is obtained by using the npar1way procedure in SAS. 
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and industry concentration level (chi-square = 45.45, p = 0.0001).  However, the findings 
do not support the first hypothesis that when industry concentration is high, JVs are the 
preferred mode of expansion. On the other hand, the results in Table 5 support the second 
hypothesis that when negative competitive effects are stronger than positive information 
effects, IPO firms choose industries with high concentration levels. In addition, the 
findings show that both JV and IPO firms tend to choose highly concentrated industries. 
While 62.81 percent of joint ventures is established in highly concentrated industries, 
73.69 percent of IPOs prefer highly concentrated industries. In low concentrated 
industries, percentage of IPO and JV announcements is very similar, 11.77 and 12.16 
percents respectively. This shows that IPO and JV firms do not prefer highly competitive 
industries indicating that negative competitive effects are stronger than positive 
information effects. The chi-square test is also applied to a sample that includes all two-
parent joint venture announcements with available HI numbers for the period of 1993-
2002. The results are reported in the appendix 3. However, the findings for both samples 
do not change the direction of the results reported in Table 5. That is, both IPO and JV 
firms prefer to expand into highly concentrated industries 
 Table 6 shows that as industry concentration increases, number of IPO and JV 
announcements decreases. This might seem to be contradictory to the findings reported in 
Table 5. However, results in Table 5 are based on Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued 
by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. Under these guidelines, the 
findings in Table 6 also indicate that IPO and JV firms prefer highly concentrated 
industries. Table 6 shows that majority of IPO and JV announcements take place in 
industries where HI is greater than 0.20, which is highly concentrated according to the 
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guidelines. It is shown that when industry is very highly concentrated (that is HI greater 
than 0.8) the number of IPOs (135) in these very highly concentrated industries is greater 
than the number of JVs (14). Graph that depicts the data in Table 6 is presented in 
appendix 3. Additionally, again for robustness check, distribution of all two-parent joint 
venture announcements for the same HI intervals is also presented in the appendix. The 
findings are very similar to the ones that are reported in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Distribution of IPO and first JV announcements based on 








(n=726) 89 259 166 89 51 20 22 16 3 11 
IPOs 
(n=2497) 292 435 384 376 345 374 119 37 26 109 
 
4. Conclusion  
 The core objective of this study is to examine the effects of industry concentration 
on the choice of expansion modes, IPO vs. JV. The literature related to this study can be 
partitioned into two segments. The first segment of the literature related to this study has 
focused on the ownership choice between JV and wholly-owned subsidiary modes of 
entry. The second segment has studied the effects of IPO announcements on rival firms 
within the same industry. However, there has not been any study on the choice of 
expansion mode between JVs and IPOs under different industry concentration levels. For 
this, two different hypotheses are developed and tested: The first hypothesis states that 
when target industry is highly concentrated, the preferred mode of expansion should be 
JV. The second hypothesis states that when negative competitive effects are stronger than 
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positive information effects, IPO firms will choose highly concentrated industry. The 
empirical findings in this study support the second hypothesis but not the first one. This 
prediction suggests that an IPO announcement in a low concentration industry is going to 
have negative effect on rival firms. In order to avoid negative reaction by rivals in a low-
concentration industry, IPO firms will expand into highly concentrated industries. When 
companies announce joint ventures for the first time, they also prefer highly concentrated 
industries. Including all two-parent joint venture announcements, regardless of their first 
or subsequent announcements, did not change the direction of the results. Both IPO and 
JV companies tend to choose industries with high concentration level. The welfare effect 
of both IPO and JV announcements on shareholders’ wealth is also examined. For this, 
daily average and cumulative average excess returns based on equally weighted market 
index from CRSP are used. The findings show that on the day of announcement, 
shareholders of joint venture firms gain 2.49 percent average excess return whereas 
shareholders of IPO firms gain 0.20 percent average excess return on the first trading day 
after the announcement day. However, in the longer time period (180 days), cumulative 
average excess return for IPO firms (2.03 percent) is significantly higher than cumulative 









A1. Distribution of Joint Ventures and IPOs Based on SIC Codes 
Table A1: The distribution of IPOs and joint ventures across industry groups 
using the four-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code 
Industry groups SIC IPOs % 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing          0100-0999 9 0.21 
Mining           1000-1299 10 0.23 
Oil and Gas Extraction         1300-1399 71 1.66 
Nonmetalic Minerals Except Fuels           1400-1499 2 0.05 
Construction           1500-1799 48 1.12 
Food and Kindred Products           2000-2099 53 1.24 
Tobacco Products           2100-2199 4 0.09 
Textile Mill Products           2200-2299 10 0.23 
Apparel and other Textile Products           2300-2399 28 0.66 
Lumber and Wood Products           2400-2499 7 0.16 
Furniture and Fixtures         2500-2599 14 0.33 
Paper and Allied Products       2600-2699 16 0.37 
Printing and Publishing         2700-2799 44 1.03 
Chemicals and Allied Products         2800-2899 208 4.87 
Petroleum and Coal Products          2900-2999 3 0.07 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 3000-3099 22 0.51 
Leather and Leather Products 3100-3199 7 0.16 
Stone, Clay and Glass Products           3200-3299 19 0.44 
Primary Metal Industries           3300-3399 37 0.87 
Fabricated Metal Products 3400-3499 30 0.70 
Machinery, Except Electrical 3500-3599 207 4.85 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment          3600-3699 397 9.29 
Transportation Equipment         3700-3799 66 1.54 
Instruments and Related Products           3800-3879 211 4.94 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries           3900-3999 54 1.26 
Cars: Transportation          4000-4799 96 2.25 
Telephone and Telegraph Communication           4800-4829 160 3.75 
Radio and Television Broadcasting           4830-4899 89 2.08 
Utilities: Electric, Gas, and Water Supply          4900-4949 18 0.42 
Garbg: Sanitary Services           4950-4959 12 0.28 
Steam: Steam Supply           4960-4969 1 0.02 
Water:   Irrigation Systems          4970-4979 0 0.00 
Wholesale          5000-5199 203 4.75 
Retail: Retail Stores         5200-5999 293 6.86 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate           6000-6999 358 8.38 
Services        7000-8999 1452 33.99 
Govt: Public Administration          9000-9999 10 0.23 
Everything Else   3 0.07 
Total  4272 100% 
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Table A2: Distribution of first and all two-parent joint ventures across industry 
groups using the four-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code. 
 
Industry type SIC JVa % JVb % 
Food and Kindred Products           2000-2099 25 2.84 555 4.17 
Tobacco Products           2100-2199 5 0.57 35 0.26 
Textile Mill Products           2200-2299 3 0.34 89 0.67 
Apparel and other Textile Products           2300-2399 21 2.38 7 0.05 
Lumber and Wood Products           2400-2499 2 0.23 31 0.23 
Furniture and Fixtures         2500-2599 5 0.57 41 0.31 
Paper and Allied Products       2600-2699 11 1.25 136 1.02 
Printing and Publishing         2700-2799 32 3.63 441 3.32 
Chemicals and Allied Products         2800-2899 147 16.69 2972 22.35 
Petroleum and Coal Products          2900-2999 7 0.79 153 1.15 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 3000-3099 9 1.02 247 1.86 
Leather and Leather Products 3100-3199 3 0.34 1 0.01 
Stone, Clay and Glass Products           3200-3299 7 0.79 176 1.32 
Primary Metal Industries           3300-3399 28 3.18 343 2.58 
Fabricated Metal Products 3400-3499 9 1.02 144 1.08 
Machinery, Except Electrical 3500-3599 143 16.23 1676 12.61 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment          3600-3699 235 26.67 3266 24.57 
Transportation Equipment         3700-3799 29 3.29 1691 12.72 
Instruments and Related Products           3800-3879 131 14.87 1094 8.23 











   a: first announcements only, b: all two-parent joint venture announcements 
A2. Distribution of Joint Ventures and IPOs Based on Industry Concentration 
Table A3: Distribution of IPO and all two-parent JV announcements based on 
three degrees of industry concentration: low, medium and high. 
 Low Medium High Total 
IPOs (observed) 





























































A3. Distribution of IPO and All Two-parent Joint Venture Announcements Based  
      on Herfindahl Index Intervals for the Period of 1993-2002 
 
Table A4: Distribution of IPO and first and all two-parent JV announcements 
based on different HI intervals for the period of 1993-2002. 
 
















































































































A4. Cumulative Excess Returns  
 























Distribution of IPO and first JV announcements based 
































Distribution of IPO and all JV announcements 
































Percent distribution of IPOs and first and all two-parent 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions and Prospects for Future Research 
 A joint venture is a way of combining resources to achieve some objective. Two 
or more parent companies pool their resources to accomplish that objective under the 
combined management of the parent companies. It is a new legal entity owned by two or 
more parent firms. Joint ventures are an increasingly common and important type of 
cooperative strategy in today’s dynamic markets. The synergy hypothesis states that joint 
ventures are formed to create synergies resulting from sharing complementary skills and 
resources and stock markets should react positively to joint venture announcements. Joint 
ventures are also established to share risk to overcome uncertainty in demand and 
technology. Previous literature on joint ventures is drawn from the welfare effects of joint 
ventures. However, there has been a little amount of study on both risk and welfare 
effects of joint venture announcements on shareholder’s wealth. For that reason, this 
dissertation is entirely dedicated to fill this existing gap in joint venture literature. 
 Chapter I, validity of diversification and risk-sharing motives for the creation of 
joint ventures are tested. The "standard event study" technique based upon the market 
model is used to examine the risk, diversification and return effects of two-parent joint 
venture announcements only. For the purpose of risk analysis, total risk is partitioned into 
systematic risk and unsystematic risk. In order to see if there is any difference in the risk 
and welfare effects of joint ventures under different joint venture structures, the initial 
sample is divided into different sub samples based on Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) codes of parent companies and the joint ventures. The overall sample analysis 
indicates that the systematic risk decreases while unsystematic risk and total risk 
increase. The same applies to the sub-sample where two parent companies from different 
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industries announce a joint venture in an entirely different industry. The analysis for the 
sample where both parents choose not to diversify shows no significant change in all 
three risk measures. The results for the sub-sample where both parents within the same 
industry engage in a joint venture in a different industry exhibit weak evidence that the 
systematic risk decreases while, with strong evidence, unsystematic risk and total risk 
remain the same. Similarly, when a sub-sample is created where one parent is in the same 
industry as the joint venture, the results for the non-diversifying parent provide weak 
evidence that the systematic risk decreases and strong evidence that there is no change in 
unsystematic risk and total risk. Finally, the findings for the diversifying parents show 
strong evidence that unsystematic risk and total risk increase and weak evidence that the 
systematic risk falls. For all the samples, the estimation results suggest that there is strong 
evidence that the shareholders of the companies engaged in joint ventures, on average, 
experience highly significant positive abnormal returns – approximately between 16 
percent and 44 percent - at the time of such announcements. These results show returns 
that are relatively much higher than those found in previous studies. However, average 
abnormal returns after the day of announcement are mostly negative or not significantly 
different from zero. 
 Chapter 2 aims at finding empirical evidence for the relative size hypothesis in 
joint venture announcements involving only two firms that differ in their sizes for the 
period of 1981 to 2002. Market capitalization and abnormal returns based on the market 
model methodologies are utilized to test for the validity of the relative size hypothesis. 
Each firm in the sample is categorized as “small”, “medium” or “large” firm in the joint 
venture based upon the market value of common equity. Then, three sub-samples that 
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include relatively different size firms announced joint ventures are formed. Empirical 
findings based on these to methodologies support the relative size hypothesis predicts that 
market reaction to a joint venture announcement is inversely related to firm’s size relative 
to its partner. The risk analysis of joint ventures between small and large size partners 
shows that systematic risk for both parents, regardless of their relative size, decreases 
while unsystematic and total risk levels do not change. Secondly, when the joint venture 
is between small and medium size parents, the medium size parents benefit from lower 
level of systematic risk through joint ventures whereas small parents experience no 
change in systematic risk. Both small and medium size parents do not observe any 
change in both total and unsystematic risks. Finally, when a sub-sample is formed where 
medium size firms partner with large firms, medium size firms do not experience any 
change in all three risk measures while large size firms experience increase in all three 
measures of the risk.  
 Chapter 3 studies the impact of industry concentration on the choice of expansion 
mode between joint ventures and IPOs. The literature related to this study can be 
partitioned into two groups. The first group focuses on the ownership choice between JV 
and wholly-owned subsidiary modes of entry. On the other hand, the second group 
studies the effects of IPO announcements on rival firms within the same industry. 
However, there has not been any study on the choice of expansion mode between joint 
ventures and IPOs under different degrees of industry concentration. For this, two 
different hypotheses are developed and tested: The first hypothesis states that when target 
industry is highly concentrated, the preferred mode of expansion should be join venture. 
The second hypothesis states that when negative competitive effects are stronger than 
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positive information effects, IPO firms will choose highly concentrated industry. This 
study finds empirical support for the second hypothesis but not for the first one. The 
empirical findings show that both IPO and joint venture companies tend to choose highly 
concentrated industries. The welfare effect of both IPO and joint venture announcements 
on shareholders’ wealth is also examined. The findings document that in the longer time 
period, cumulative average excess return for IPO firms is significantly greater than 
cumulative average excess return for firms that establish joint venture. 
This dissertation can be extended to more than two-parent joint ventures. Further 
research needs to be carried out in this direction. It is also important to note that this 
dissertation is an empirical study of market reactions to domestic joint ventures. Similar 
analysis can be conducted for international joint ventures. For this, country-based 
analyses could also be done to test for diversification implications of international joint 
ventures. Economies throughout the world differ with respect to their capital markets, 
investment risk, and growth opportunities. Therefore, it is worthwhile to conduct further 
research on stock market reactions to joint venture announcements in different countries 
based on their efficiency of capital markets, growth opportunities and investment risk 
levels.  
 
